A/HRC/3/2 page 40 applicable even if civilians remain in the zone of operations after a warning has been given. Threats in the past, for example that all remaining civilians would be considered liable to attack, have been condemned and withdrawn.122 152. International humanitarian law also prohibits “acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population”.123 Statements calling for the evacuation of areas that are not genuine warnings, but are intended to frighten or cause panic among residents or compel them to leave their homes for reasons other than their safety, could fall under this prohibition. 153. Military planning staff should pay strict attention to the requirement for any warning to be “effective”. The timing of the warning is of importance. In some cases IDF is reported to have dropped leaflets or given loudspeaker warnings124 only two hours before a threatened attack. Having given a warning, the actual physical possibility to react to it must be considered. 154. As the High Commissioner for Human Rights has pointed out, “Many people are simply unable to leave southern Lebanon because they have not transport, because roads have been destroyed, because they are ill or elderly, because they must care for others who are physically unable to make the journey, or because they simply have nowhere to go”125. 155. Also of great concern was the physical danger they might face if they heeded the warning and took to the roads. There were number of civilians who, when warned by IDF to evacuate, did so only to be attacked on their way out. On 15 July, for example, a number of families fled the southern Lebanese village of Marwaheen after IDF warned them to evacuate. On the road leading to the coast through Chamaa the convoy was attacked, leaving 23 dead (see detailed report earlier). On 7 August, Israeli warplanes dropped leaflets over southern Lebanon with the following wording: “Any vehicle of any kind travelling south of the Litani River will be bombarded, on suspicion of transporting rockets, military equipment and terrorists. Anyone who travels in any vehicle is placing his life in danger”.126 This obviously made further evacuation from the area extremely difficult if not impossible. 156. If a military force is really serious in its attempts to warn civilians to evacuate because of impending danger, it should take into account how they expect the civilian population to carry out the instruction and not just drop paper messages from an aircraft. 157. To be truly “effective”, the message should also give the civilians clear time slots for the evacuation linked to guaranteed safe humanitarian exit corridors that they should use. Military staff should ensure that civilians obeying evacuation orders are not targeted on their evacuation routes. 158. A warning to evacuate does not relieve the military of their ongoing obligation to “take all feasible precautions” to protect civilians who remain behind, and this includes their property. By remaining in place, the people and their property do not suddenly become military objectives which can be attacked. The law requires the cancelling of an attack when it becomes apparent that the target is civilian or that the civilian loss would be disproportionate to the expected military gain.127 Official statements issued during the conflict by Israeli authorities cast doubt on