A/HRC/20/12 Judges of the Constitutional Chamber should first be appointed for seven years and could only be reaffirmed for life upon completion of the initial term. 34. On 1 March 2012, a Parliamentary conciliatory commission reviewed the vetoes to be submitted to Parliament. The following day, Parliament voted in favour of the amendments to the law on CSJ. The most controversial amendment is section 5 of article 19, which stipulates that the president has a right to return to CSJ the proposed candidates for judges of local courts without any reasoning; and CSJ is now stripped of its powers to override the President’s veto on the candidates, being obliged to conduct a new selection process and propose new candidates instead of those vetoed by the President. ROCA believes that this provision seriously undermines the independence of the selection process conducted by CSJ and may inadvertently lead to the exertion of covert pressure on CSJ to propose only those candidates acceptable to the President. 35. On 17 January 2012, President Atambaev issued a Decree creating a Commission to develop various legislative proposals by 31 March 2012, including the selection and appointment of judges; improvement of judicial oversight ensuring adversarial trial proceedings and equality of arms; improvement of the material and financial resources of courts; the security of the parties to the trial, and effective implementation of court decisions through adoption of laws on court bailiffs; improving the system of training for judges and court staff; introducing effective accountability mechanisms for judges; as well as other measures aimed at the improvement of the judicial function. Discussions are ongoing to clarify which branch of power plays the leading role in the reform process, how thematic areas covered by the mandate of the Commission will be streamlined, and who will initiate legislative proposals developed by the Commission. 36. A seminar for CSJ took place from 2-5 November 2011, co-organized by ROCA and international partners. Five international experts provided their expertise on applicable international standards and national best practices concerning the selection of judges. C. Administration of justice in the aftermath of the June 2010 violence 37. Since the June 2010 violence in the south of Kyrgyzstan, serious institutional deficiencies have hampered the delivery of justice and undermined the rule of law. Lack of progress in addressing these matters impacts on reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts between the ethnic communities, as well as between civil society and authorities, and poses serious risks for the long-term stability of the country. 38. Criminal investigations into the June 2010 violence appear to have been marred by discriminatory practices against ethnic minorities. Only 7 per cent of the criminal cases related to the June 2010 violence have been initiated. 3 Official statistics indicate that ethnic Uzbeks currently comprise 77 per cent of those detained and charged for serious crimes committed during the June 2010 violence. If the investigations and prosecutions into these crimes are not radically improved in terms of fairness and impartiality, the exercise will continue to lack legitimacy. Arbitrary arrests, ill-treatment and torture 39. Human rights violations continue to be committed during police investigations into the June 2010 violence. These include arbitrary arrests, torture and ill-treatment in detention, forced confessions, and extortion including of private property. The impact of these violations on the affected individuals and the broader communities is hard to measure, 3 8 Office of the General Prosecutor, 28 February 2012.