A/HRC/30/45 be difficult to distinguish between some “smart” unilateral coercive measures and comprehensive ones, as will be exemplified hereunder. 17. Whether comprehensive or “smart”, unilateral coercive measures are hard to reconcile with the Declaration on the Right to Development and in particular with its article 3, which stipulates that “States have the duty to cooperate with each other in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to development”. 18. In summary, any unilateral coercive measure imposed on a country necessarily runs counter to some provisions of the International Bill of Human Rights or peremptory norms and other provisions of customary law. Such measures entail, to different degrees, adverse consequences on the enjoyment of the human rights of innocent people. There is a very wide range of human rights that might be involved, including political, economic, social and cultural rights. The focus of impact assessment should remain on the rights to life, health and medical care, an adequate standard of living, food, education, work, housing and development. The justification provided for unilateral coercive measures is the claim that they aim at the improvement of the human rights situation overall in the targeted country. Thus, it is said that the cost in human rights terms of the coercive measure is justified by the greater human rights benefits expected to accrue from such measures. It remains to be seen whether human rights lend themselves to this kind of calculus. 19. A variety of expressions are being used to refer to unilateral coercive measures. Some refer to them as “sanctions”, others as “restrictive measures” and others still use them interchangeably or jointly as, say, “restrictive measures (sanctions)”. The term “restrictive measure” does not carry the same ethical overtones of punishment as “sanctions”. However, it eschews the mention of “unilateral”, which itself raises the issue of legitimacy of such measures since what is unilateral can, in given circumstances, lack legitimacy. The term “unilateral coercive measures”, though more cumbersome, has the advantage of not prejudging any of the aforementioned, rather controversial, issues. 20. The Special Rapporteur will use the expression “source countries” when referring to countries initiating and applying unilateral coercive measures and the expression “target countries” to mean countries that have been targeted by unilateral coercive measures, whether the latter themselves are comprehensive or targeted at a particular sector, area or at specific persons. 21. It may be said that the “sanctioning” authority, in order to be legitimate, should have jurisdiction over the “sanctioned” State. It might have to be mandated by the international community to uphold international standards and coerce “deviant” States into conforming to an international agreement or to internationally accepted norms of conduct. It might even, in certain circumstances, be entitled to do so of its own accord. Usually the Security Council has the central authority in this regard. Yet Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations refers to coercive measures taken by the Council simply as “measures” rather than “sanctions”. To suggest that States can impose “sanctions” on other States while the Security Council itself only imposes “measures” that truly deserve to be called “multilateral sanctions”, and which will be referred to as such by the present mandate, implies that decisions of States that impose unilateral coercive measures have at least the same legal cogency as those of the Security Council. It also implies that there is a hierarchy among States, between the “sanctioning” and the “sanctioned”. This runs counter to the spirit of the Charter and in particular to Article 2(1), which refers to the sovereign equality of all the States Members of the United Nations. 22. Unilateral coercive measures are said to be “extraterritorial” because they are initiated by a country or group of countries and imposed outside their national territory or jurisdiction. The laws imposing them may have extraterritorial effect not only on targeted countries but also on third countries in a manner that will coerce the latter to also apply the 6