A/HRC/27/70 issues related to the appointment, transfer and promotion of judges. The Supreme Council also receives complaints and takes disciplinary actions against judges. The executive should have no role to play in such matters. In addition, the Special Rapporteur had previously recommended that judges and prosecutors should not be active members of a political party (A/HRC/15/46, para. 67) and had hoped that the law on the status of judges and prosecutors would spell out a requirement to that effect much more explicitly. 38. The Special Rapporteur is most concerned that the Law on the Status of Judges and Prosecutors will ultimately inhibit the ability of the justice sector to reform from within by requiring prior approval from the Supreme Council of Magistracy before a judge or a prosecutor can publicly express himself or herself on issues related to their work. While judges and prosecutors should clearly not comment on the cases before them, they should not be prevented from contributing to debates on matters of public interest relating to the law, the administration of justice and the judiciary. 39. The Special Rapporteur, however, also acknowledges some positive advances in the three laws. He recognizes the value of establishing regional appeals courts and of the inclusion of a higher proportion of elected judges and prosecutors to serve on a full-time basis on the Supreme Council of the Magistracy than is the case at present. Recalling that two of the three laws were envisaged in the 1993 Constitution, he welcomes their longoverdue adoption, despite the flaws outlined above. Setting out in binding law the requirements for the organization of courts, the status of judges and prosecutors, as well as the composition and operation of the Supreme Council of the Magistracy, the laws will serve to fill an important legal void. 40. The performance of the judiciary in practice demonstrates that there is a long way to go. In the case of the seven CNRP Members of Parliament elect and one supporter who were arrested in relation to the incident of 15 July 2014, the lack of material evidence needed for their arrests on very serious charges and their speedy release on the evening of the successful negotiations between the two parties on 22 July clearly reveal the extent to which the judiciary continues to be influenced by the executive. This experience demonstrates the urgency of the task of implementing and improving the three laws so that the judiciary will finally be able to serve its intended purpose: to render justice in an independent and impartial manner. D. Reform of Parliament 41. In his 2011 report to the eighteenth session of the Human Rights Council (A/HRC/18/46), the Special Rapporteur outlined a series of measures relating to the Parliament that he considered critical for the process of democratization in the country. Many of them concerned specific matters that directly impact on the ability of the Parliament to function properly, to enact laws that promote and protect human rights, to be accessible to its diverse constituency and to be a model for society in promoting a culture of constructive criticism and popular participation. The Special Rapporteur is of the view that speedy parliamentary reform is also essential to enable the opposition to formally play a meaningful role as an opposition in Parliament. He looks forward to seeing a specific reform plan agreed upon by the two parties being made public as soon as possible. 42. The Special Rapporteur reiterated his main recommendations for parliamentary reform during his mission in June 2014 and called upon Parliament to henceforth be more transparent and open to consultations as part of its work. Specifically, he called on the parliamentary commissions to assume their roles in reviewing the compliance of domestic laws with international standards and regularly review government regulations and practices against the original laws to which they were intended to give effect. 11