A/HRC/11/41 page 15 specific judges which, in practice, can lead to serious abuse.59 Therefore, the Special Rapporteur recommends to Member States to establish a mechanism to allocate court cases in an objective manner. One possibility could be drawing of lots or a system for automatic distribution according to alphabetic order.60 A second one could be done through pre-determined court management plans which should incorporate objective criteria61 according to which cases are to be allocated. These plans need to be as detailed as to prevent manipulation in the allocations of cases. 8. Independence within the judiciary 48. The Special Rapporteur notes that the independence of judges needs to be protected both from outside and internal interference. For both, adequate structures within the judiciary are decisive. In this context, the Special Rapporteur draws attention to the procedures applied for the appointment or election of court chairpersons. 49. Judges need to work in an environment which is conducive to independent decision-making. To avoid having internal judicial hierarchy run counter to the independence of judges, the Special Rapporteur encourages Member States to consider introducing a system whereby court chairpersons are elected by the judges of their respective court. 50. Furthermore, appropriate structures and conditions need to be put in place in order to avoid situations in which the overturn of judgements by higher judicial bodies includes a sanction to the lower-level judges that made those rulings, which would result in a lessening of the independence of an individual judge within the judiciary. 9. Investigations into allegations of improper interference 51. An important indicator for the independence of the judiciary is that inquiries are conducted into improper interferences into judicial affairs. In this context, it is important to note that the Human Rights Committee recommended to several Member States that independent and impartial investigations into all allegations of interference be conducted thoroughly and promptly and that perpetrators be prosecuted and punished.62 The Special Rapporteur emphasizes that such investigations are a key means to prevent the reoccurrence of further interference and to detect systemic problems hampering the independence of the judiciary. 59 E/CN.4/2005/60/Add.2, para. 59. 60 See also Recommendation No. R (94) 12 (footnote 14), principle I (2) (e). 61 These criteria could include: the date of the application or referral to the court, per alphabetic order of the surname of one of the parties or their residence or per area of law of the dispute at hand. 62 CCPR/CO/82/ALB, para. 18; CCPR/C/BRA/CO/2, para. 17.