A/HRC/11/41 page 8 provisions that seriously endanger the independence of the judiciary pointing to the accountability of a court to the legislature.11 In other instances, the Human Rights Committee pronounced its concern at the practice of the judiciary seeking the opinion of a Standing Committee of the legislature on the interpretation of laws, turning a Parliamentary Committee into the instance responsible for setting criteria and instructions which are binding on the judiciary.12 3. Selection and appointment 23. The Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary prescribe that judges be selected on the basis of integrity and ability and that any method of judicial selection should include safeguards against judicial appointments for improper motives.13 This key principle is also established by a number of regional standards.14 Furthermore, the Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa highlight the importance of transparency and accountability in the selection and appointment procedures.15 24. The Special Rapporteur takes note of the variety of existing systems for the selection and appointment of judges worldwide. One can broadly distinguish political appointments (selection by the legislative or executive branches of power), appointments by popular elections, corporative appointments (by bodies composed of judges only), selection by judicial councils with plural representation, or a variety of mixed systems where the nominating body is of one type (e.g. judicial council) and the one in charge of appointments is of a different nature (e.g. a political appointing body). He wishes to highlight below aspects of selection and appointment procedures that crucially strengthen judicial independence. 25. The Special Rapporteur notes the existence of manifold constitutional provisions and domestic legislation providing for the election of judges by the legislature. He would like to raise the general concern that the involvement of the legislature in judicial appointments risks their politicization.16 On many occasions and in light of situations studied by the Special Rapporteur, it is difficult to ascertain the benefit this procedure brings, particularly to the selection of lower-level judges. But even for higher-level courts for which the selection of nominees is 11 CCPR/CO/72/PRK, para. 8. 12 CCPR/CO/75/VNM, para. 9. 13 Principle 10. 14 Recommendation No. R (94) 12 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, principle I (2) (c); Principles and Guidelines in Africa (footnote 8), A (4) (h); Bejing Statement (footnote 8), principles 11, 12 and 15. 15 16 Principles and Guidelines in Africa (footnote 8), A (4) (h). See allegation letter to the Government of Serbia of 5 November 2009, A/HRC/11/41/Add.1, Serbia; Committee against Torture, CAT/C/SRB/CO/1, para. 9; also CCPR/C/79/Add.50, para. 288.