A/HRC/44/61 7. Pursuant to such “evacuation” or “reconciliation” agreements 10 between 2016 and 2018, nearly 100,000 individuals were forcibly displaced – essentially from Aleppo, eastern Ghouta, rural northern Homs and Yarmouk camp in Damascus11 – to Idlib, which became perceived as their last place of refuge. By April 2019, when violence in the north-western part of the country markedly increased,12 Idlib Governorate and neighbouring north-western Aleppo Governorate had become home to some 4 million people. 8. Towards the end of 2019, fighting escalated further, particularly in locations south of the M4 and east of the M5 highways (see annex II). Schools, hospitals and markets were bombed out of service, while camps for displaced civilians were also struck.13 9. Approximately one million people then fled en masse deeper into the north-west of the country, crammed in vehicles, as aerial attacks followed them while they desperately searched for safety. The already overstretched humanitarian response in northern Idlib and parts of Aleppo reached a breaking point, amid harsh winter conditions. 10. Against this backdrop, the Security Council reached a last-minute agreement on 10 January to renew until July the cross-border and cross-line aid delivery mechanism. The crossings were reduced from four to two border crossings with Turkey. Shortly afterwards, the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) began to spread around the world. With numerous health facilities rendered non-operational, the estimated 1.4 million people – 80 per cent of whom were women or children14 – living in overcrowded displacement sites across the northwest of the Syrian Arab Republic had little access to basic health care, and little practical possibility to follow guidance on handwashing and social distancing. Their unfettered access to humanitarian aid remained more critical than ever. III. Political and military developments 11. As hostilities intensified in December, the Syrian Air Force, supported by the Russian Aerospace Forces (jointly denominated pro-Government forces),15 targeted armed groups’ controlled areas in Idlib, Ladhiqiyah and western Aleppo Governorates, while Government forces including the Syrian Arab Army pushed forward to recapture areas around the M5 highway. Armed groups and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham terrorists launched counter-attacks against Government positions in Idlib, Aleppo and Ladhiqiyah, including the Hmeimim airbase. 12. In the context of the mounting military escalation in the north-west of the country, the Russian Federation and Turkey agreed to establish a new ceasefire on 9 January, though lower intensity strikes and clashes continued. On 15 January, the ceasefire faltered and proGovernment forces resumed attacks in Idlib. By 28 January, the Government had recaptured control of Ma’arrat al-Nu’man and increased attacks on armed group positions in western Aleppo. In parallel, pro-Government forces attempted to recapture Saraqib, another strategic town, at the junction of the M4 and M5 highways. This heightened tensions between the Government and Turkey, after the latter established new observation posts in response to the Government advances in the de-escalation zone. 13. On 3 February, the Turkish army targeted several positions held by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic in retaliation for the killing of eight Turkish military personnel, following the shelling of a Turkish position near Saraqib. Despite the Turkish intervention, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic gained control of Saraqib and several surrounding areas on 6 February. Tensions further rose on 10 February when another attack by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic killed five Turkish soldiers in Taftanaz. In the meantime, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic re-established control over the 10 11 12 13 14 15 A/HRC/39/65, para. 64. Ibid., paras. 73–76 and 79. A/HRC/42/51, para. 15. A/HRC/43/57, paras. 24–26, and annex II. https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/recent-developments-northwest-syria-flash-update29-may-2020. A/HRC/31/68, footnote 3. 3