A/HRC/45/33 operations outside the context of the Operations for People’s Liberation and the Operations for People’s Humane Liberation. 103. The Special Action Forces unit was created in April 2016 as an elite tactical force within the National Bolivarian Police. Sources with inside knowledge of the unit described it to the mission as unprofessional and lacking training. 104. The mission investigated 11 cases involving 18 extrajudicial executions by State security forces, which are included in case studies in the full report. The mission also conducted an extensive review of cases reported by local press from January 2014 to December 2019 in order to corroborate patterns and changes over time. In total, the mission reviewed 2,417 incidents involving 4,681 deaths by security forces outside of the context of the Operations for People’s Liberation and the Operations for People’s Humane Liberation. 105. Investigations revealed that two security forces – the Scientific, Criminal and Criminological Investigator Corps, and the National Bolivarian Police and Special Action Forces – were responsible for 59 per cent of killings in the years under review. Both of these institutions depend administratively and functionally on the Ministry of Interior, Justice and Peace. Between 2014 and 2018, the Scientific, Criminal and Criminological Investigator Corps was the security force most commonly involved in cases (45.4 per cent). Subsequently, in 2019, the National Bolivarian Police and Special Action Forces were identified as the perpetrators in the majority of cases (64.5 per cent). 106. In the cases reviewed, the victims were largely young males. The male victims fell between the following age ranges: under 18 years of age (6 per cent), aged 18 to 25 (51 per cent), aged 26 to 35 (31 per cent) and aged over 35 (11 per cent). Only 27 cases reviewed involved women as victims of killings. 107. Although women were not primary targets of physical violence in the operations, in at least 4 of the 11 cases documented, female family members reported being physically assaulted by security forces. In almost all of the cases documented, surviving female relatives reported suffering significant economic hardship following the executions of their sons, brothers or husbands. 108. In the cases investigated, the police approached houses directly, suggesting that they had prior intelligence to identify and locate the victims. According to the investigations, the National Bolivarian Police and Special Action Forces kept files with information about targets, including photos, names, nicknames and suspected crimes. Interviewees also confirmed that information was gathered from community-based informants, including the community councils. 109. Overall, however, officers of the National Bolivarian Police and Special Action Forces interviewed consistently indicated that intelligence work was deficient, lacked adequate resources and was frequently incorrect. 110. The killings most often took place in the victim’s house or in the neighbourhood. In several cases, the police carried out the operations in the early morning or late at night, at times when the persons targeted would likely be at home. Police entered homes without presenting a warrant. To ensure there were no witnesses, police removed the victim’s family members, primarily women, older persons and children, from their homes or isolated them from the target in separate locations in the house. 111. In several cases, neighbourhoods were cordoned off and neighbours were told to stay inside their homes. Some were still able to see or hear certain relevant events, such as shouting or shots fired. In some cases, the police told family members that they were radioing headquarters to check the victim’s criminal record before the killings were committed. 112. A source with inside knowledge of operations of the National Bolivarian Police and Special Action Forces told the mission that, after the background check, the head of the operation in direct communication with superiors could request and receive a “green light to kill”. To kill is referred to by the code “80”. 113. The mission documented a pattern of shootings at point blank range in vital areas, including the head and thorax, with one or two shots. One former officer of the National Bolivarian Police and Special Action Forces said that he and his colleagues refer to killings 13