A/HRC/14/38 the basis on which peace rested as a right with individual and collective application. Thus, Mr. Yutzis noted, through its dual character — individual and collective — the right to peace made it possible to assert the broader notion of the human right to peace. Fifth, the right to peace had a definite individual dimension, which was assessed through the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 28. Mr. Yutzis recalled that specialized agencies of the United Nations also pursued the same aspirations for peace. In international and regional organizations there were equally abundant provisions relating to peace as an individual and collective right. The links between peace and security and respect for human rights inside and outside nations highlighted in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 29. Finally, Mr. Yutzis recalled that the private encoding of the human right to peace by civil society also reflected both the collective and the individual dimension of that right. Thus, in the Luarca Declaration on the Human Right to Peace, a document which was adopted by a committee of experts from civil society organizations, several articles detailed the scope of the individual applications of the right, which can be understood to apply to peoples as well. The Declaration also contained the generally accepted principle of dual ownership of the human right to peace. He noted that peace was indivisible, and thus manifested itself as a collective right of the human community of peoples and States while, at the same time, directly affecting each human being as an individual right. 30. Laurent Goetschel stated that the analysis of the content of the right of peoples to peace required a particular approach. Mr. Goetschel proposed a three-tiered approach to the right of peoples to peace. The first tier was the prohibition of the use of force in the Charter of the United Nations. A post-modern interpretation of the Charter could allow the right to peace to contribute to and strengthen the prohibition of aggression. The notion of active prevention policy could be a contribution to the systematic worldwide implementation of a right to peace. It could lead to new priorities of the Security Council and the Human Rights Council and might even lead to new institutions. The second tier was a process perspective, which had a timeline. That tier was not about the justiciability of the right to peace, but referred to the right to a certain process. Such a process, which was not yet defined, could lead to strengthening certain rights, such as to development, education or health, and could lead to the prioritization of those rights and their systematization in the light of each other. Defining a process could be one of the major objectives of defining the right to peace. The third tier was context relevance. There was no definition of the right to peace at the general level that could be applied to the concrete context-relevant levels. Peace at the overall policy level was still largely politicized and populated with particular agendas that not all States would share. IV. Session 3: The right of peoples to peace from a human rights perspective 31. The third session opened with a keynote address by Antônio Cançado Trindade, a judge with the International Court of Justice. In the address he discussed five key aspects related to the right of peoples to peace. In 1990, when speaking at the Global Consultation on the Right to Development as a Human Right, Mr. Cançado Trindade had addressed conceptual aspects such as the subjects, legal basis and contents of that right, its obstacles GE.10-12138 9