A/HRC/33/42 exception of Glamis Gold v. United States, indigenous peoples’ rights and interests were effectively ignored by tribunals and considered immaterial to proceedings, despite the fact that violations of their rights and efforts to assert them had been core issues underpinning the disputes in question, and the decisions could have had potentially profound impacts on their rights and well-being. 56. The decision in that case is regarded as forward-looking in terms of ensuring respect for the protection of indigenous peoples’ sacred spaces and demonstrating that awards can be sensitive to and inclusive of indigenous peoples’ issues. The tribunal’s decision that a 50 per cent reduction in the projected earnings, arising from a measure aimed at protecting indigenous peoples’ sacred places, did not constitute indirect expropriation and that the measures did not constitute a “manifestly arbitrary” denial of justice, supports this view. 57. However, the tribunal essentially ignored the position articulated in the Quechan nation amicus submission that international human rights law as it pertained to the rights arising in the case should be considered applicable law. A related critique is that the tribunal relied heavily on the robust legislative history in California relating to the environment in the determination of what constituted an investor’s legitimate expectation, thereby setting a dangerous precedent in jurisdictions that do not have such a history. 58. How a tribunal would respond to such an argument is unknown. An alternative argument could be that, in States where the rule of law is weak, legislative reform to respect human rights is inevitable once the political environment matures sufficiently. As State obligations in relation to indigenous peoples exist under international human rights law, a reasonable investor should expect that they will eventually be implemented, as any expectation that they will not is blatantly unjust and lacks legitimacy. A clearer position on behalf of the tribunal, that a State maintains the right to regulate in order to protect its indigenous peoples’ rights, as recognized under international human rights law, would have avoided this ambiguity. 59. One reason provided for the failure of tribunals to address indigenous rights was the State’s failure to raise human rights issues in its arguments, a view also expressed by tribunals in other cases. This contrasts with the pending cases of Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Peru and South American Silver Mining v. the Plurinational State of Bolivia, in which the States place significant emphasis on indigenous peoples’ rights, in particular consultation and free, prior and informed consent rights, as meriting consideration by the tribunals. This development points to a potential synergy between affording protection to indigenous peoples’ rights in domestic regulation and international investment agreements and reducing the risk of potentially costly lawsuits in the context of measures affecting investor protections. 60. These cases also raise important issues regarding corporate and State responsibilities in relation to consultations seeking to establish the free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples, and the relationship that such consent has in establishing an investment over which an investor can claim protection. In doing so, the cases give tribunals an opportunity to address an issue of fundamental importance to indigenous peoples’ rights and to ensuring greater coherence between the international investment law and international human rights law. An overarching issue that arises relates to the role of corporate human rights due diligence in determining legitimate expectations in contexts where social conflict and rights violations appear inevitable in the absence of free, prior and informed consent. 61. The cases also illustrate the frequent tensions that arise between the international human rights law and international investment law regimes. In Burlington Resources Inc. v. Ecuador, the contrast is striking between the findings of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights that the State used unnecessary and excessive force against the indigenous 14