A/HRC/42/CRP.5 present in the village at the time of the attack. The soldiers’ public manner and amount of time they took to set up camp, place artillery at a monastery, walk around the village and rest under trees before opening fire on Sin Taung indicates that the Tatmadaw was not concerned that the AA was present in the areas, would attack them or could prepare for a counterattack. There are no indications that the monastery, from which the Tatmadaw launched its lengthy attack, sustained any damage or that soldiers stationed in the monastery were injured or killed. This also indicates to the Mission that the Tatmadaw knew that the AA was not present immediately before or during the course of its attack. 306. The Tatmadaw must have known that the village was populated with civilians, who went about their daily activities as they saw the Tatmadaw enter the area. The Tatmadaw also opened fire on the morning of 22 March deterring villagers from collecting and caring for the wounded. With strong indications of the AA’s absence and undeniable indications of a civilian presence in Sin Taung, the Mission concludes on reasonable ground that the Tatmadaw’s attack on Sin Taung on 21-22 March 2019 was either indiscriminate or may have been directed against civilians, both are violations of international humanitarian law and the latter amounts to a war crime.698 The Mission also concludes on reasonable grounds that the Tatmadaw violated its obligation to enable the wounded villagers to be collected and cared for.699 The Tatmadaw violated this obligation in two respects. First, the Tatmadaw could and should have collected the wounded and it violated this obligation when it failed to do so.700 From all indications, soldiers were available and the AA was absent from the area. Other operational constraints, such as time and distance, did not appear to be constraining factors. Second, even if it was unreasonable for the Tatmadaw itself to collect the wounded, the Tatmadaw violated its general obligation to enable the wounded to be collected and cared for when it fired upon villagers who sought to assist the wounded.701 Furthermore, given that the Tatmadaw had ample time to warn villagers of an impending attack and that doing so would have had no noticeable negative military repercussions on the Tatmadaw, the Mission concludes on reasonable grounds that, even if the military’s attack was directed at the AA, the Tatmadaw failed in its obligation to give effective advance warning to the civilian population under circumstances that permitted it to do so.702 (c) Sai Din Waterfall, Buthidaung Township - 3 April 2019 307. The Mission received credible reports that, on the afternoon of Wednesday 3 April, the Tatmadaw used two helicopters during an attack that resulted in the deaths of at least nine Rohingya.703 More than ten Rohingya, including at least five minors, were seriously injured in the attack.704 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 94 J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, “Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume I: Rules” (Cambridge, ICRC/Cambridge University Press, 2005), rule 11 (indiscriminate attacks), rule 1 (the principles of distinction between civilians and combatants), and rule 156 (definition of war crimes). Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions, 3(1)(2). See also J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Ibid., rule 109 (search for, collection and evacuation of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked). Jean-Marie Henckaerts, eds., Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, International Committee of the Red Cross, 15 December 2016, Commentary to Article 3, paras 751 and 753. Ibid., para 768 (“In order to protect the wounded and sick, those searching, collecting and caring for them, as well as their transports and equipment, also need to be protected”). See J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, “Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume I: Rules” (Cambridge, ICRC/Cambridge University Press, 2005), rule 20 (advance warning). CI-287, FI-026, RI-019. CI-287, FI-023, FI-026, FI-027, See also, Reuters, “Myanmar villagers, lawmaker say 'helicopter attack' kills five Rohingya, wounds 13” (04 April 2019), UCANEWS, “Six Rohingya killed in Rakhine helicopter attack” Myanmar military claims that Muslim villagers were with Arakan Army members in Buthidaung (05 April 2019), Radio Free Asia, “Myanmar Army Helicopter Attack Kills at Least 10 Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State” (04 April 2019), The Irrawaddy, “Six Rohingya