A/HRC/42/CRP.5 combination of a lack of security, including due to landmine contamination that poses serious risk of death and maiming, and the stripping of lands through the VFV Law that makes it impossible to return to their homes and lands to sustain their livelihoods and carrying out their lifestyle of communal land use. The Mission’s collection of facts about the human rights situation in northern Myanmar demonstrate that their concerns are fully justified. The Mission is also deeply concerned by Myanmar’s restrictions on humanitarian relief in northern Myanmar, which is contributing to deteriorating living conditions for the civilian population. The Mission reminds the Government of its obligations under the ICESCR and CRC to recognize and ensure the right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food and housing, and the highest attainable standard of health. 1493 F. Situation in northern Myanmar requiring further monitoring: the Kokang Self-Administered Zone 627. As a situation the requires attention, the Mission conducted preliminary research into the main human rights issues in the Kokang Self-Administered Zone (the Kokang region), home to a majority of ethnic Kokang1494 in northern Shan State. The Kokang SelfAdministered Zone is located in northern Shan State along the Chinese border. It is largely inaccessible to international humanitarian organisations, the media and human rights organisations. There is no active civil society in the Kokang region, due to insecurity resulting from the conflict. Nonetheless, the Mission obtained six first-hand accounts, supplemented with credible information from secondary sources, including open source materials. The Mission found it important to draw attention to this situation, most notably due to the participation of the Kokang-based MNDAA in the “Brotherhood Alliance” in attacks in August 2019. 628. The Kokang region has a history of struggle for power, autonomy and conflict. 1495 In 2008 the Tatmadaw proposed to incorporate the MNDAA into its Border Guard Force (BGF).1496 The MNDAA split into two factions, 1497 with one being integrated into the BGF and the other, led by Peng Jiasheng, the leader of the MNDAA, refusing to integrate. This 1493 1494 1495 1496 1497 166 ICESCR, art. 11 and art. 12; CRC, arts. 24 and 27. The Kokang people constitute 30 to 40 per cent of Myanmar’s ethnic Chinese population and approximately 90 per cent of the population in the Kokang Self-Administeredative Zone, with others resident in the Kokang region being Shan, Palaung (Ta’ang), Hmong, Wa, Lisu, Bai and Bamar. The Kokang are Mandarin-speaking Han Chinese.See Mya Than, "The Ethnic Chinese in Myanmar and their Identity", in Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians, Leo Suryadinata, ed. (Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), pp. 119–20. The British acquired the territory of the Kokang region in 1897 after signing the Beijing Convention with the Chinese government. During the 1950s, shortly after Myanmar gained independence, the Nationalist Chinese part of the Kuomintang took refuge in Kokang. The region was then under the control of a number of warlords. In 1968, the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), with the support of China, backed a military coup in the region led by Peng Jiasheng. The CPB army was the main military force in the region until 1989 when, due to inter-ethnic tensions, the CPB army split into four regional armies along ethnic lines: the United Wa State Army (UWSA); a Peng-led force of ethnic Kokang in Kokang region; a force in eastern Shan State led by Peng’s son-in-law, Sai Leün (or U Sai Lin or Lin Mingxian); and the former CPB forces at Kambaiti and Pangwa in Kachin State. The Pengled Kokang force became the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). See Bertil Lintner, “Kokang: The Backstory” (The Irrawaddy, 9 March 2015). The Border Guard Forces in northern Myanmar were formerly a non-State armed group or “ethnic armed organization”. They are integrated with and subordinate to the Tatmadaw. They are armed, supplied and trained by the Tatmadaw, and the Tatmadaw assumes control over their actions during operations. See A/HRC/39/CRP.2., para. 1535; E. Han, “Geopolitics, Ethnic Conflicts along the Border, and Chinese Foreign Policy Changes toward Myanmar”, Asian Security, vol 13(1), 2017, p. 64; BM-038. PI-098; Myanmar Peace Monitor, “Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party”.