A/HRC/28/32 to punish and deter crime fairly; to respect human rights; to support democratic institutions; to minimize friction between the military and civilians; to engage and maintain public confidence; and to encourage recruitment and the retention of personnel. In terms of public confidence in military justice, he suggested that the “public” included voters, military personnel, parents of conscripts or potential volunteers, the legal profession and scholarly community, the legislature, the executive branch, civilian courts, the Human Rights Council and the Human Rights Committee, regional human rights courts and bodies, and foreign Governments and citizens. 41. According to Mr. Fidell, questions could arise with regard to who was subject to military jurisdiction This would normally include active duty personnel, although it raised the question of whether this included persons to be integrated into the armed forces prior to enlistment. He also asked whether this would cover reservists or soldiers who had retired or been recently discharged. He subsequently raised the issues of civilians in general, explaining that questions had arisen, for example, about persons who had resisted conscription and refused to join the military, government employees and contractors working for the military, military dependents, and a wide range of persons with no specific relation to the military. 42. While noting that the Human Rights Committee in its general comment No. 32 stated that civilians could, in exceptional situations, be tried in military courts, Mr. Fidell made reference to a concurring opinion in Musaev v. Uzbekistan (communications Nos. 1914-16/2009), where two members of the Committee stated that “civilians or retired military personnel” should never be tried before military courts and that the Committee needed “to review the current position of the Committee, which considers the trial of civilians in military courts to be compatible with the Covenant. 13 43. According to Mr. Fidell, there were two basic approaches to determine whether civilians should be tried in military courts: a statutory approach, which specified clear dividing lines concerning who could and could not be tried by military courts; and an ad hoc case-specific approach. The potential tests that could be applied in the latter approach could include considerations of whether there would be an abuse of process in military courts; whether the proportional loss of benefits of a civilian process would be outweighed by the benefit of a military trial in certain circumstances; and whether a civilian forum was available to try the civilian in a given case. 44. Mr. Fidell referred to Martin v. United Kingdom, in which the European Court of Human Rights stated that: “ While it cannot be contended that the Convention [for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms] absolutely excludes the jurisdiction of military courts to try cases in which civilians are implicated, the existence of such jurisdiction should be subjected to particularly careful scrutiny, since only in very exceptional circumstances could the determination of criminal charges against civilians in such courts be held to be compatible with Article 6… The power of military criminal justice should not extend to civilians unless there are compelling reasons justifying such a situation, and if so only on a clear and foreseeable legal basis. The existence of such reasons must be substantiated in each specific case... 45. In The Queen v. Wehmeier, the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada articulated a test for exercising military jurisdiction over civilians, stating: 13 10 CCPR/C/104/D/1914, annex, appendix.