A/HRC/28/32 62. With regard to draft principle 9, which stated that serious violations of human rights should not be judged by military courts, Mr. Decaux stated that this prohibition should extend to the investigation of such crimes, with civilian authorities having this responsibility. The Committee on Enforced Disappearances had recommended that the investigation of the crime of enforced disappearance be undertaken by the competent civilian authorities; and that a State party should adopt measures to ensure that the accused is suspended from his functions during the proceedings. 19 Mr. Decaux noted that there could be exceptions to this during a foreign military operation where it is not possible for an investigation to be undertaken by a civilian authority to gather evidence and identify witnesses. In such circumstances, the military police, the gendarmerie or other military authorities would have to undertake the investigation. Nevertheless, such an investigation should be subject to an independent judicial authority to have credibility. 63. Mr. Decaux pointed out that draft principle 8 stated the jurisdiction of military courts should be limited to offences of a strictly military nature committed by military personnel. He explained that military jurisdiction should remain exceptional and apply only to the requirements of military service. Such an exception could arise in a situation of foreign deployment where the national court is prevented from exercising its jurisdiction for practical reasons arising from the remoteness of the action, while the local court that would be territorially competent was confronted with the issue of jurisdictional immunities. He also noted that international humanitarian law also addressed the role of military justice.20 While there may be justification for the trial of military personnel for military offences by military courts, the same did not apply to appellate jurisdictions, which should be civilian and integrated into the overall civilian judicial system, in accordance with draft principle 17. 64. Colonel Patrick Gleeson (retired), Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Canadian Armed Forces, addressed the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, and in particular draft principles 8 and 9, which he stated reflected an unwarranted bias against military courts in favour of civilian courts, and should therefore be either re-drafted or removed. He argued that this bias was troubling and internally inconsistent with goals and objectives of the draft principles. 65. Colonel Gleeson referred to the two core purposes of military justice codified in Canadian Military Justice Legislation: (a) to promote the operational effectiveness of the Canadian Forces by contributing to the maintenance of discipline, efficiency and morale; and (b) to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society. He argued that this dual function made sense in a framework where the military was intended to serve broader society and reflect societal values. It was with these dual purposes in mind that draft principle 8 should be examined. Draft principle 8 concluded implicitly that only uniquely military offences have an impact on military discipline, and ultimately morale and operational effectiveness. Colonel Gleeson argued that this was simply not the case. Acts of theft, assault or fraud, the use of or trafficking in illicit drugs, for example, were all offences under civilian law. The fact that they happened to be civilian offences, however, in no way diminished their impact on discipline. An assault on a peer in a military unit had no less a corrosive effect on discipline and morale than an act of insubordination. Colonel Gleeson argued that to allow a military justice system to deal with insubordination but not the assault did not promote or advance the purposes of military justice; it rather undermined it. In addition, military interests and more broadly national 19 20 14 CED/C/NLD/CO/1, para. 19; CED/C/PRY/CO1, para. 16. See Geneva Conventions relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, , arts. 84 and 102, and relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 66.