A/HRC/28/32 interests often required that military justice systems be in a position to demonstrate an ability to prosecute offences, regardless of their nature, in a foreign State. This was particularly true when discussing the substance of Status of Forces Agreements entered into between sending and receiving States. 66. Colonel Gleeson further noted that the purpose and function of a military court, the unique requirements of military discipline, the impact that civilian criminal offences had on discipline and the practical requirements of nations deploying their forces on expeditionary operations all highlighted the appropriateness of military justice systems being in a position to exercise jurisdiction over civilian offences. 67. The extension of jurisdiction over civilian offences to military justice systems was not an “either/or” proposition. According to Colonel Gleeson, the Canadian justice system created a concurrent jurisdiction model between the military justice system and the civilian justice system. This model essentially provided that military personnel were liable to be charged and tried in either system for most civilian offences. There was no displacement of civilian jurisdiction; rather, there was a layering on of an additional option when an individual’s status brought them within the jurisdiction of the military justice system. This concurrent jurisdiction had an extraterritorial effect, as defence legislation provided civilian courts with jurisdiction over any person subject to military jurisdiction who commits an offence outside the country. 68. With regard to draft principle 9, which provided that military courts should never exercise jurisdiction in response to allegations of serious human rights violations, Colonel Gleeson noted that two reasons for this position were advanced in the commentary on the draft principles. The first was that the commission of serious human rights violations was outside the scope of the duties performed by military personnel; and second, military authorities might be tempted to cover up such cases. He pointed out that, while it was true that the commission of serious human rights violations did not properly fall within the scope of the duties of military personnel, neither did the commission of “ordinary”, crimes such as murder, rape, fraud or theft. 21 69. Colonel Gleeson also argued that, where a court, military or otherwise, was properly constituted as described in draft principles 1, 2 and 12 to 15, there was no basis for a universally applicable rule, which would deny military jurisdiction over serious human rights violations. He maintained that the conclusion implied by draft principle 9, that military justice systems worldwide could not be trusted to deal with these offences, ignored the objective facts. He emphasized that such offences struck at the very core of military discipline and operational effectiveness. Armed forces had a significant interest in seeing that such breaches were dealt with fairly and expeditiously. It was important to recognize that the failure of military commanders to respond quickly and effectively to allegations of serious human rights violations raised potential questions of personal liability through the doctrine of command responsibility. 70. The second reason advanced in the commentary to support draft principle 9 was that military authorities might be tempted to cover up such cases. Draft principle 9 presumed that any military justice process would be inherently sympathetic to members of the military committing serious violations of human rights and be inclined to mitigate punishment imposed on the accused. Colonel Gleeson maintained that such an approach in a disciplined military force subject to appropriate civilian oversight was contrary to the ethos of a professional military. He noted, however, that should military justice systems fail 21 See Michael Gibson, “International human rights law and the administration of justice through military tribunals: preserving utility while precluding impunity”, Journal of International Law and International Relations, vol. 4, No. 1 (2008), pp. 1-48. 15