A/HRC/28/32 again regarding Chile, the Committee had recommended that human rights violations by members of security forces should not fall within the purview of military tribunals. Mr. Seetulsingh added that similar recommendations had been made for other states, including the Central African Republic, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and the Russian Federation. 23. In Estrella v. Uruguay (communication No. 74/1980), the Human Rights Committee found violations of article 14 because the accused was tried in camera, did not have the assistance of counsel, and attempts were made to compel him to testify against himself.3 In Mansaraj v. Sierra Leone (communication No. 839/1998),4 the Committee stressed that there should be the right to appeal to a higher tribunal from a military court. In Kurbanova v. Tajikistan (No. 1096/2002),5 the Committee found a violation of article 14 because the State had not provided any information to justify the trial of a civilian before the Military Chamber of the Supreme Court. In Madani v. Algeria (communication No. 1172/2003),6 the Committee found a violation of article 14 because the State party had not justified the trial of a civilian before a military court. Two members of the Committee disagreed with the views expressed in Madani, pointing out that article 14 was not concerned with the nature of a tribunal as long as it was competent, independent and impartial. They argued that the Covenant did not prohibit the use of military tribunals; in Algeria, military courts had assigned jurisdiction established by law; the Committee could not replace the State to adjudicate on the merits of alternatives to military courts, nor could it adjudicate on exceptional circumstances to determine whether or not there was a public emergency. Mr. Seetulsingh added, that in Akwanga v. Cameroon (No. 1813/2008),7 the Committee had found a violation of article 14 when the State party did not justify why a civilian was tried by a military court, and concluded that it did not need to examine whether the military court, as a matter of fact, had afforded the full guarantees of article 14. 24. In concluding, Mr. Seetulsingh asked whether there was a danger that the uncompromising approach by the Committee might lead to a situation where the views of the Committee were more honoured in the breach than inobservance. He pointed out that the grounds of the dissent in Madani were worth considering, since many States parties to the Covenant remained unwilling to comply with the views of the Committee. 25. Seong-Phil Hong, a member of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, explained that the Working Group had found that military tribunals were often used to deal with political opposition groups, journalists and human rights defenders, and that placing of civilians in preventive detention and the trial of civilians by military courts constituted a violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 26. A military judge who is neither professionally nor culturally independent was likely to produce an effect contrary to that afforded by guarantees of a fair trial. The Working Group had determined that a court composed of military personnel could not be considered “a competent, independent and impartial tribunal” under human rights law. 27. The Working Group had determined that military tribunals should only be competent to try military personnel for military offences; if civilians and military personnel had been indicted in a case, military tribunals should not try the military personnel separately; military courts should not try military personnel if any of the victims are civilians; military tribunals should not be competent to consider cases of rebellion, sedition 3 4 5 6 7 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/38/40), annex XII. CCPR/C/72/D/839/1998. CCPR/C/79/D/1096/2002. CCPR/C/89/D/1172/2003. CCPR/C/101/D/1813/2008. 7