A/HRC/23/22 conscientious objection to military service. Nevertheless, the Human Rights Committee has concluded that a right to conscientious objection to military service derived from article 18 exists and has articulated its position in its general comment No. 22 (1993) on the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and in its jurisprudence relating to individual communications to the Committee. 7. In that general comment, the Committee stated: “The Covenant does not explicitly refer to a right to conscientious objection, but the Committee believes that such a right can be derived from article 18, inasmuch as the obligation to use lethal force may seriously conflict with the freedom of conscience and the right to manifest one’s religion or belief” (para. 11). 8. In its jurisprudence adopted subsequent to the elaboration of that general comment, the Committee also found a right to conscientious objection in a series of views on individual communications: Yoon and Choi v. Republic of Korea,2 Jung et al. v. Republic of Korea,3 and Jeong et al. v. Republic of Korea.4 In Yoon, the Committee explained that a right to conscientious objection could be based on article 18 although it is not explicitly mentioned in the article, and moreover that the right existed notwithstanding the language in article 8 of the Covenant, which states that “the term ‘forced or compulsory labour’ shall not include … any service of a military character and, in countries where conscientious objection is recognized, any national service required by law of conscientious objectors”. In the Yoon case, the Committee stated that “article 8 of the Covenant itself neither recognizes nor excludes a right of conscientious objection. Thus, the present claim is to be assessed solely in the light of article 18 of the Covenant”. This explanation was important because in an earlier case decided in 1985, L.T.K. v. Finland,5 the Committee appeared to suggest that article 8 precluded an obligation on States to provide for conscientious objection to military service. 9. In the Yoon case, decided in 2006, the Committee indicated that conscientious objection to military service should be treated as a manifestation of religion or belief. However, in the Jeong case, decided five years later in 2011, the Committee stated that conscientious objection to military service “inheres in the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion”. 10. Subsequently, in 2012, the Committee repeated its position that there is a right to conscientious objection to military service based on article 18 of the Covenant in Atasoy and Sarkut v. Turkey.6 However, a divided Committee in Atasoy and Sarkut provided clarification on the issue of whether conscientious objection was a manifestation of religion or belief as indicated in Yoon or, as stated in the Jeong case, “inheres in the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion”. In Atasoy and Sarkut, the Committee followed the reasoning in the Jeong case and concluded that the right to conscientious objection to military service is inherent in the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. In an individual opinion of Committee member Sir Nigel Rodley, jointly with members Mr. Krister Thelin and Mr. Cornelis Flinterman (concurring), it was stated that: The implication of relying on that provision [that the right is a manifestation of religion or belief] is that circumstances could be envisaged in which the community interests contemplated by the provision could override the individual’s conscientious objection to military service. This goes against all our experience of the 2 3 4 5 6 4 Communications Nos. 1321-1322/2004, Views adopted on 3 November 2006. Communications Nos. 1593-1603/2007, Views adopted on 23 March 2010. Communications Nos. 1642-1742/2007, Views adopted on 24 March 2011. Communication No. 185/1984, decision of admissibility, 9 July 1985. Communications Nos. 1853-1854/2008, Views adopted on 29 March 2012.