A/HRC/42/39 62. When the Working Group determines that the deprivation of liberty of conscientious objectors to military service is arbitrary, it will require the relevant State to immediately release the individuals involved (if they are not already at liberty, for example, on bail), to accord them an enforceable right to compensation and other reparations and to expunge their criminal records.19 The Working Group will also request the State to bring its laws, particularly the provisions found to have resulted in the arbitrary deprivation of liberty of conscientious objectors, into conformity with the State’s commitments under international human rights law. 63. The Working Group also reminds States to respect, protect and fulfil the right to personal liberty of conscientious objectors to military service by exercising due diligence to prevent their expulsion, return (refoulement) or extradition to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to arbitrary deprivation of liberty. 64. The Working Group notes the recent developments in the Republic of Korea on this specific issue. In June 2018, the Constitutional Court issued an opinion that the mandatory military service without an alternative for a conscientious objector does not align with the Constitution. The Working Group anticipates that this jurisprudential development will benefit all those in the country who had been subjected to the previous legal regime, while it should serve as an example to other countries. B. Use of registers to avoid arbitrary detention 65. Depriving an individual of liberty signals an inevitable power shift in the relationship between the detained individual and the authorities depriving that individual of liberty. International human rights has put in place safeguards to ensure that no arbitrary deprivation of liberty takes place. These safeguards include the right to be informed of the reasons for arrest and prompt notification of the charges, the right to be presented before a judicial authority without delay as well as the right to challenge the legality of detention before a judicial authority (article 9 (2), (3) and (4) of the Covenant). International human rights law also requires compliance with a number of other safeguards aimed at preventing the possibility of arbitrary detention. These include the right of the detained person to notify family members of his or her whereabouts, the right to request and receive legal assistance, as well as the right to request and receive medical assistance.20 66. In its jurisprudence and during its country visits, the Working Group has highlighted how the failure to observe these safeguards can lead to arbitrary deprivation of liberty.21 The Working Group views detention registers as crucial tools in preventing arbitrary detention 22 as the obligation to duly maintain these registers minimizes the risk that the authorities would not comply with the safeguards.23 67. During its visits to different places of deprivation of liberty, the Working Group observed various registers including registers for incidents, family visits, doctors’ visits and transfers.24 The Working Group commends the use of such other registers, but these cannot be substitutes for the detainee register which records essential information. 68. In the view of the Working Group, the detainee registers should be duly compiled, promptly updated and conform to the minimum requirements as set out in article 17 (3) of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. Detainee registers should be duly maintained at each place of deprivation of liberty irrespective of the type of such facility, in particular at non-traditional places of 19 20 21 22 23 24 28 CCPR/C/KOR/CO/4, paras. 44–45. United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), rules 6–10, 24–25, 30–34 and 58. See also opinions No. 78/2017, No. 2/2018, No. 4/2018, No. 42/2018, No. 43/2018, No. 67/2018 and No. 79/2018. See opinions No. 67/2018, No. 70/2018 and No. 79/2018; and A/HRC/7/4, paras. 69–73. A/HRC/42/39/Add.1. See also A/HRC/7/4, para. 69. Nelson Mandela Rules, rules 6–10, 24–25, 30–34, 36–41 and 58.