A/HRC/13/72 60. The organized violence perpetrated by these groups in rural and urban areas allows them to enforce visible “social control”, forcing people to directly or indirectly support their activities. They continue to forcibly recruit and use children and youth, through deceit or economic incentives, inter alia, for drug trafficking, killings or intelligence work. 61. Some of these groups operate in similar ways to old paramilitary organizations, participating in criminal activities such as drug trafficking, extortion, stealing of lands, prostitution, and human trafficking, as well as engaging in lawful but at times irregular activities, such as lotteries and security services. Their ranks include demobilized and nondemobilized former members of paramilitary organizations, some recruited voluntarily and others forcibly. Several former paramilitary middle-ranking fighters and former military personnel now hold senior positions in these groups. 62. These groups occasionally reach agreements amongst themselves or with local combat units of FARC-EP or the National Liberation Army (ELN) to facilitate illegal businesses, particularly drug trafficking. They engage in bloody disputes with rival groups or even amongst themselves, generating further violence against civilians who are caught in the middle. OHCHR-Colombia has identified cases of collusion, principally as a result of corruption, but also tolerance and acquiescence, of members of the security forces with these groups. 63. These groups are evolving rapidly and continuously. While the Popular Revolutionary Anti-Communist Army of Colombia (ERPAC), which operates in the Los Llanos region, has a structure similar to that of the former United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), other groups have adopted a cellular operational structure, co-opting and contracting criminal organizations to carry out their activities. OHCHR-Colombia is increasingly receiving information about some groups, such as ERPAC or the Rastrojos, which, in some regions of the country, would exhibit the operational and organizational capacity typical of armed actors, as defined by international humanitarian law. 64. The scope of organized violence committed by these groups, their substantial economic power, capacity to corrupt authorities and State institutions, links with local authorities and local networks of influence, their impact on social actors and the alarming levels of violence against civilians make them a daunting challenge to the rule of law. 65. Government efforts against these groups have achieved positive results, but the challenge posed by these groups goes well beyond common criminality. The fact that these groups operate in regions where former paramilitary groups once operated, using their economic and political structures, reiterates the need to both redouble preventive mechanisms for the population at risk (especially youth in urban and rural areas) and protect and attend those affected. J. International humanitarian law 1. Guerrilla groups 66. In recent years, the internal armed conflict has moved towards the periphery and border regions of the country, forcing guerrilla groups to retreat and operate in small groups, at times dressed as civilians, using small arms and anti-personnel mines in a widespread manner. In these areas of retreat, FARC-EP and ELN have had a long-term presence and have been able to obtain resources from illicit crops, smuggling and extensive extortion. GE.10-11819 13