A/HRC/31/74 that enhancing education on a global level had proved challenging but could be assisted by advocating best practice examples. Mr. Dembowski highlighted that networking and cooperation were an important part of FIFA’s ability to combat racism as FIFA did not have experts on all relevant issues. The expert stressed the need for FIFA to cooperate with experts on racism to further their strategic approach. 143. The expert explained how FIFA assisted all member federations to improve along those five pillars. Although FIFA’s power was limited as member associations were independent, FIFA could intervene to a certain degree. FIFA has implemented a Task Force on Racism, which was interdisciplinary and had recently hired a specialist on nondiscrimination in order to enhance the operative level. The expert further explained how FIFA trained football federations and match commissioners on anti-discrimination issues and highlighted the recent implementation of a FIFA anti-discrimination monitoring system. Mr. Dembowski then explained how high risk matches were identified and match observers (trained by the non-governmental organization FARE) were sent to those matches. Following each match FIFA received a match report that had the same importance as the referee’s match report. From that report FIFA decided if a case needed to be opened and whether an incident necessitated investigation. FIFA has also implemented and continues to celebrate annual anti-discrimination days. 144. The expert finally highlighted the intersectional approach of FIFA to antidiscrimination and explained that FIFA not only dealt with racism but consistently checked on what grounds a person was attacked (e.g. because she was a women, gay, lesbian etc.) The expert stressed the importance of addressing discrimination at large. The expert closed by describing FIFA’s online platform to enable an ongoing exchange on best practices with the hope to encourage federations to take national action. 145. Daniela Wurbs, of the non-governmental organization Football Supporters Europe (FSE) introduced the FSE network which connected fans, organized campaigns, worked for the empowerment of fans and held dialogues with a variety of institutions. 146. Ms. Wurbs stated that fans were often only perceived as the main problem of football. There was a variety of reasons for racism in sport: athletes were mirrors of society but racism could also be used as a means for provocation by a minority of fans during a competition (the “us” against the “other”); and sport infrastructure often supported the exclusion of certain groups of society (such as women). 147. Ms. Wurbs stated that there might be a lack of such counter reactions by fans to racism in sport due to: a lack of education/information (adding that FSE did not support this argument as it presented an easy excuse); non racist fans fear of speaking up (culture of fear in the stands); anti-racism could be seen as breaking an established “no politics” consensus within the fan base; and, clubs and football associations were sometimes part of the problem — by virtue of marginalizing the problem. 148. She explained that the solution might be found in simple crowd dynamics. Indiscriminate use of force was seen by the crowd as illegitimate. Such force led to a counter reaction (solidarity effects of the crowd with the perpetrators). The aim was therefore for fans to regulate themselves. Peer pressure was the most valuable tool to achieve change. FSE acknowledges that this was the most sustainable solution. Consequently, fans needed to be empowered in order for peer pressure to be applied and for good examples to be shown. In order to implement this solution a multi-agency approach should be applied; indiscriminate treatment of fans (as the majority of the fan base consisted of non-racist fans) should be avoided; and clear messaging and credible long term messaging was needed (not red cards once a month). 149. Ms. Wurbs said that some of the key principles that should determine interventions were: the clear recognition of a problem; that institutions set clear messages (until the 45