A/HRC/19/33 16. Since the 1960s, the non-intervention principle has repeatedly figured in General Assembly resolutions,18 culminating in the 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty,19 the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations20 and the 1981 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States,21 with a particular emphasis on economic measures. 17. While it is accepted that General Assembly resolutions as such cannot create binding legal obligations, they may be declaratory of existing customary international law or contribute to its emergence.22 18. The difficulty lies, however, less in accepting the non-intervention principle as a principle of international law.23 Rather, it has proven difficult to agree on the precise definition of what constitutes “intervention” and, in particular, whether economic coercive measures fall under the core of the customary international law principle of nonintervention. 19. What can be deduced from the above-mentioned resolutions and from the Court‟s judgment in the Nicaragua case24 is that two elements are crucial for assessing to what extent measures, including economic ones, may contravene the principle of nonintervention: coercion and the intention to change the policy of the target State where the latter choice should be a free one.25 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 6 Already in 1957 the General Assembly, in its resolution A/1236 (XII) on peaceful and neighbourly relations among States, referred to “non-intervention in one another‟s internal affairs” as one of the bases for relations between States. See also the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (resolution 3281 (XXIX)); Declaration on the Establishment of the New International Economic Order (resolution 3201 (S-VI)); and resolutions 31/91 (1976 Declaration), 32/153, 33/74, 34/101 and 35/159 on non-interference in the internal affairs of States; 39/210, 40/185, 41/165, 42/173, 44/215, 46/210 and 48/168 on economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries; and 52/181, 54/200, 56/179, 58/198, 60/185 and 62/183 on unilateral economic measures as a means of political and economic coercion against developing countries. General Assembly resolution A/2131 (XX) (1965 Declaration). Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV)). General Assembly resolution 36/103 (1981 Declaration). Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports (1996) 226, paras. 70-71. International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities (footnote 15 above), para. 202 (“The principle of non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign State to conduct its affairs without outside interference […] the Court considers that it is part and parcel of customary international law.”). Ibid., para. 205 (“the principle forbids all States or groups of States to intervene directly or indirectly in internal or external affairs of other States. A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely. One of these is the choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy. Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices, which must remain free ones”.) Nevertheless, on the facts in this case, the International Court of Justice upheld the economic coercive measures applied, namely the imposition of a unilateral trade embargo, drastic reduction of the sugar import quota, and cessation of economic aid, while taking issue with the military support afforded to an insurgent group (ibid., paras. 239 to 245). See also Maziar Jamnejad and Michael Wood, “The principle of non-intervention”, Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 22 (2009), p. 371.