A/HRC/23/37 24. This suggests that debt relief under the two initiatives has generally not reduced the vulnerability of heavily indebted poor countries,24 with many remaining profoundly dependent on foreign borrowing and investment. It is also evident that, with their particular focus on correcting imprudent debt management on the part of the indebted countries, the initiatives have ignored and failed to address the underlying causes of the debt problem such as unfair terms of trade, irresponsible lending and poor policy prescriptions by the international financial institutions. B. Poverty reduction and development 25. Recipient countries under the international debt relief mechanisms have to commit to allocate resources freed up by debt relief to key anti-poverty programmes which are outlined in their PRSPs. Due to the fungibility of public expenditures in most national budgets, however, it is not easy to track debt relief savings and therefore properly ascertain their impact on poverty reduction. Moreover, the empirical evidence on the impact of debt relief on social spending is inconclusive. While some studies have found a positive correlation between debt relief and increased social spending, 25 others have found that debt relief has had little or no effect on such spending in HIPCs. 26 26. According to IMF and the World Bank, however, for the 36 countries that have benefitted from debt relief, these expenditures have increased on average from 6.3 per cent of GDP in 2001 to 8.8 per cent of GDP in 2011. 27 Before the HIPC Initiative, eligible countries were, on average, spending “slightly more” on debt service than on health and education combined.28 As a result of debt relief they have increased markedly their 24 25 26 27 28 In 2009, UNCTAD raised concerns that there was potential for a new debt crisis to emerge in poor countries because of the global financial crisis. See UNCTAD, Least Developed Countries Report 2009, available from www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?docid=11721&intltemlID=2068&lang=1. See for example, J.D. Lewis, “What comes after debt relief? Some preliminary thoughts,” GREAT Insights, vol. 2, No. 1 (January 2013); Jesus Crespo Cuaresma and Gallina Andronova Vincelette, “Debt Relief and Education in Heavily Indebted Poor Countries,” in Carlos A. Primo Braga and Dörte Dömeland (eds.) Debt Relief and Beyond: Lessons Learned and Challenges Ahead (Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2009), pp. 35-48; E. Lora and M. Olivera, “Public debt and social expenditure: friends or foes?” Working Paper No. 563 (Washington DC, Inter-American Development Bank, 2006), available from http://ssrn.com/abstract=905964. See for example, S.E. Dessy and D. Vencatachellum, “Debt relief and social services expenditure: the African experience, 1989-2003,” African Development Review, vol. 19, No. 1 (April 2007), pp. 200216; N.D. Chauvin and A. Kraay, “What Has 100 Billion Dollars Worth of Debt Relief Done for Low- Income Countries?” International Finance (EconWPA) (2005) Paper No. 0510001; Ralf Hepp, “Health Expenditures Under the HIPC Debt Initiative” (29 August 2005), Social Science Research Network; S. Arslanalp and P.B. Henry, “Helping the Poor to Help Themselves” (see footnote 7); W. Easterly, “How Did Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Become Heavily Indebted? Reviewing Two Decades of Debt Relief”, World Development, vol. 30, No. 1 (2002) pp. 1677-96. See World Bank, “Debt Relief and Development”, News and Broadcast online, available from http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20040942~menuPK:34480 ~pagePK:34370~theSitePK:4607,00.html. However, independent studies indicate a considerably higher level of spending on debt servicing relative to expenditure on basic social services such as education and health care for many HIPCs. For example, between 1992 and 1997, the portion of the national budget devoted to basic social services and debt service for some HIPCs was as follows: Cameroon: 4% on social services, 36% on debt service; Cote d’Ivoire: 11.4% on social services, 35% on debt service; United Republic of Tanzania: 15% on social services, 46% on debt service; Zambia: 6.7% on social services, 40% on debt service. See D. Millet and E. Toussaint, “Figures relating to the debt for 2009” (Brussels, CADTM, 2009); 9