A/HRC/6/17 page 15 46. The application of government measures to curtail charity work because of a perceived risk that the funds might end up in support of terrorism is not always based on evidence. Such counter-terrorism measures are unlikely to be effective because they do not rely on the reality of charity work. They can also undermine general confidence in charities and encourage less transparent ways to transfer funds, thereby producing counterproductive effects. Counter-terrorism legislation has created uncertainty about the provision of humanitarian aid in some parts of the world, for example in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, even though these humanitarian activities are needed for the development of these places.24 47. In countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, military action, armed insurgency and terrorist acts have led to a security situation whereby the delivery of even the most basic humanitarian assistance is hampered. The protection of rights, such as access to health care or to basic education, is severely endangered by the weakness of State institutions and the worsening social and economic situation, which cannot develop without effective delivery of humanitarian aid. 48. Another example of measures taken to prevent the financing of terrorism resulting in a negative impact on economic, social and cultural rights is the case of Al Barakaat, which was the main organization for money transfers into Somalia and also the country’s largest private sector company, with financial involvement in other sectors.28 The company, which had become essential for the delivery of remittances sent from family members living abroad, was run by many brokers who lived in different parts of the United States and in other countries where people of the Somali diaspora had settled.29 Al Barakaat was closed down by the United States Government, even though it did not release any evidence that the money being sent to Somalia through the financial transfer system supported Al-Qaida. The Somalis who were, together with Al Barakaat, put on the terrorist list of the United States Treasury department were dropped from the list a year later. In 2002, the United Nations Development Programme stated that the closure of Al Barakaat had had a destabilizing effect on the economy of Somalia and a great humanitarian impact on the population of Somalia, who were unable to receive money from their relatives.30 28 See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Staff monograph, sect. 5 (Al-Barakaat case study) available from www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statements/index.htm#monographs. 29 See Rühl Bettina, “Die Kalaschnikow gehört zum Hausrat”, Amnesty journal, 1 July 2002, available from www2.amnesty.de/. 30 David Rowan, “US drops accusation that Somalis supported Al Qaeda”, 20 September 2002, World Socialist Web Site, www.wsws.org.