A/HRC/44/38 Cartel, the Houthis and ISIL.17 Armed groups have used commercially available “off-theshelf” systems and drones sold by States and developed their own drones.18 Non-State actors have also deployed drones in multiples of 10. For example, in 2017, in Mosul, Iraq, within a 24-hour period “there were no less than 82 drones of all shapes and sizes” striking at Iraqi, Kurdish, United States and French forces.19 The Haftar Armed Forces have carried out over 600 drone strikes against opposition targets,20 which has allegedly resulted in massive civilian casualties, including, in August 2019, against migrants in a detention centre. 21 10. Exports of commercial drone technologies have contributed to the proliferation of drones and reduced their cost. It is expected that more and more countries will develop or acquire armed drones and that, within the next 10 years, over 40 per cent of drones will be armed, with some 90 per cent of these falling in the class III category. 22 B. Expanded capability, function and form 11. The “second drone age” is also characterized by a progressive transformation in the technology itself. Currently, drones remain vulnerable to detection and technical challenges. They tend to be deployed in “low-cost, low-risk conflict engagement and with an objective to minimize the number of boots on the ground”.23 However, drones are becoming stealthier, speedier, smaller, more lethal and more easily operable by teams located thousands of kilometres away, and are therefore becoming better able to carry out targeted killings both near and far. 12. For instance, class III military drone systems can remain airborne for over 20 hours, fly more than 1,000 km at over 300 km/hour and carry heavy payloads and a sophisticated suite of hardware and software, which means they can pick up huge amounts of data, even private conversations transmitted through mobile telephones and computers. 24 Smaller drones with a 100 km-range can travel at 150/225 km/hour and carry a 30 kg warhead with air burst fragmentation explosive capacity. While some drones are piloted from within the theatre of conflict, 25 others are operated using near-real-time satellite connection: a team located near the zone of conflict guides the drone through take-off and landing, while sensor operators located thousands of miles away control the drone in flight and instruct strikes. 26 C. Problematic logic of drone-proliferation 13. The allure of drone technologies explains their proliferation: (a) Efficiency. Drones are relatively cheap to produce, easy to deploy and offer economy of effort, meaning that opting for a targeted killing is less financially onerous than alternatives such as locating and detaining/arresting the target; (b) Adaptability. Drones are truly all-terrain vehicles, deployable in a variety of settings for a range of purposes 27 by various actors, and they are amenable to ongoing technological innovations; 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/world-drones/non-state-actors-with-dronecapabilities. www.conflictarm.com/dispatches/evolution-of-uavs-employed-by-houthi-forces-in-yemen/. thebulletin.org/2019/10/the-dark-side-of-our-drone-future/. www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2019/11/mide-uavs-in-libyas-civil-war; S/2019/914. https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/01/1056052. Cited in www.sdu.dk/cws/-/media/cws/files/cws_military_drones_in_europe_report.pdf, p. 52. Ibid., p. 48. These include the Reaper, the unarmed Global Hawk, the Heron and the armed Wing Loong II. http://drones.cnas.org/reports/a-perspective-on-france/. Arthur Holland Michel and James Rogers, “Drone warfare: distant targets and remote killings”, in The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Global Security Studies, Scott Romaniuk, Manish Thapa and Peter Marton, eds. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020). This includes loitering or “persistent overwatch”, allowing a drone to be held in one geographical location for 14 hours or so and carry out strikes if deemed necessary. 5