A/HRC/41/48 and prosecutors are bound by “a duty of loyalty, reserve and discretion” to their employer,21 and are expected to “show restraint in exercising their freedom of expression in all cases where the authority and impartiality of the judiciary are likely to be called in question”.22 The duty of loyalty and discretion requires that “the dissemination of even accurate information is carried out with moderation and propriety”.23 34. The European Court of Human Rights observed that the prominent role occupied by the judiciary in a democratic society justifies leaving to the national authorities “a certain margin of appreciation” in determining whether a restriction on civil servants’ right to freedom of expression is compatible and proportionate to the aim of maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judicial system. 24 35. However, in a recent judgment, the European Court affirmed that, in view of the growing importance attached to the principles of the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary, any interference with the freedom of expression of a judge “calls for close scrutiny”, and concluded that “the applicant’s position and statements, which clearly fell within the context of a debate on matters of great public interest, called for a high degree of protection for his freedom of expression and strict scrutiny of any interference, with a correspondingly narrow margin of appreciation being afforded to the authorities of the respondent State”.25 36. It is against this background of the “margin of appreciation” that human rights courts and mechanisms test whether the interference meets the three conditions laid down in treaty provisions on freedom of expression. Restrictions on the right to freedom of expression 37. The first condition is that the interference must be provided by law. The term “law” may include various forms of regulations. To be characterized as a law, a norm should be accessible to the persons concerned and formulated with sufficient precision to enable them to regulate their conduct and foresee the consequences which a given action may entail. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights established that “the requirement of law (reserva de ley) in cases of interference in the realm of freedom is essential to the legal protection and full existence of human rights”26 and pointed out that the term “laws” does not mean any legal norm, but rather general normative acts adopted by the legislative body constitutionally foreseen and democratically elected, according to the procedures established in the Constitution. In two cases concerning disciplinary measures imposed on Italian judges as a result of their membership of the Freemasons, the European Court of Human Rights concluded that the European Convention on Human Rights had been violated because the interference had not been prescribed by law. 27 38. The second condition is that the interference with the exercise of freedom of expression should serve a legitimate aim. In most cases concerning restrictions on the freedom of expression of judges adjudicated by the European Court, the legitimate aim on which the interference is based is the maintenance of the authority and impartiality of the judiciary, sometimes combined with the protection of the rights of others. The need to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary is expressly mentioned in the Basic Principles and the Bangalore Principles as aims that may justify restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression by judges. 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 8 For example, European Court of Human Rights, Kudeshkina v. Russia (application No. 29492/05), judgment of 26 February 2009, para. 85. European Court of Human Rights, Wille v. Liechtenstein (application No. 28396/95) judgment of 28 October 1999, para. 64. Kudeshkina v. Russia, para. 93. For example, Kudeshkina v. Russia, para. 82; and Wille v. Liechtenstein, para. 61. Baka v. Hungary (application No. 20261/12), 23 June 2016, paras. 171 and 175. “The Word ‘Laws’ in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights”, advisory opinion, 9 May 1986, para. 24. N.F. v. Italy (application No. 37119/97), judgment of 2 August 2001, paras. 24–32; and Maestri v. Italy (application No. 39748/98), judgment of 17 February 2004, paras. 30–42.