A/HRC/20/27 instruments,3 including the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (art. 5). 15. According to article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the right of peaceful assembly and the right to freedom of association are not absolute rights. Resolution 15/21 (OP 4) makes clear that they “can be subject to certain restrictions, which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. 16. The Special Rapporteur emphasizes that only “certain” restrictions may be applied, which clearly means that freedom is to be considered the rule and its restriction the exception. He refers to general comment No. 27 (1999) of the Human Rights Committee on freedom of movement: “in adopting laws providing for restrictions … States should always be guided by the principle that the restrictions must not impair the essence of the right ... the relation between right and restriction, between norm and exception, must not be reversed”. As a result, when States would like to restrict these rights, all the above conditions must be met. Any restrictions must therefore be motivated by one of the above limited interests, have a legal basis (be “prescribed by law”, which implies that the law must be accessible and its provisions must be formulated with sufficient precision) and be “necessary in a democratic society”. 17. As outlined by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), “the word „necessity‟ does not mean „absolutely necessary‟ or „indispensable‟, but neither does it have the flexibility of terms such as „useful‟ or „convenient‟: instead, the term means that there must be a „pressing social need‟ for the interference”.4 When such a pressing social need arises, States have then to ensure that any restrictive measures fall within the limit of what is acceptable in a “democratic society”. In that regard, longstanding jurisprudence asserts that democratic societies exist only where “pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness”5 are in place. Hence, States cannot undermine the very existence of these attributes when restricting these rights. Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur refers to general comment No. 31 (2004) of the Human Rights Committee on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant, which provides that “where such restrictions are made, States must demonstrate their necessity and only take such measures as are proportionate to the pursuance of legitimate aims in order to ensure continuous and effective protection of Covenant rights” (para. 6). 18. In addition, only propaganda for war or advocacy for national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence (art. 20 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) or acts aimed at the destruction of the rights and freedoms enshrined in international human rights law (art. 5) should be deemed unlawful. 19. The Special Rapporteur further particularly emphasizes that the right to life and the right to be free from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment should be guaranteed by States to all individuals under all circumstances and at all times, including in the context of the exercise of the rights to freedom of association and of peaceful assembly, as prescribed by article 4 of the Covenant. The Special Rapporteur recalls that, 3 4 5 6 It is worth noting that the word “peaceful” is absent from article 11 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights. OSCE/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Key Guiding Principles of Freedom of Association with an Emphasis on Non-Governmental Organizations, para. 5. European Court of Human Rights, Handyside v. the United Kingdom, application No. 5493/72, 7 December 1976, para. 49.