A/HRC/13/34 which it might have undertaken towards other States, so that its jurisdiction became limited by rules of international law.1 20. As recalled by the International Law Commission in its commentary on the draft articles on the nationality of natural persons, since 1945, the evolution of international human rights has fundamentally changed the traditional approach based on the preponderance of the interests of States over the interests of individuals.1 The Commission also affirmed that the right of States to decide who their nationals are is not absolute and that, in particular, States must comply with their human rights obligations concerning the granting of nationality.2 This approach has been further evidenced in the practice of regional human rights courts; for example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in its advisory opinion on proposed amendments to the naturalization provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, indicated that “the manners in which States regulate matters bearing on nationality cannot today be deemed within their sole jurisdiction; those powers of the State are also circumscribed by their obligations to ensure the full protection of human rights”. Consequently, as the rapporteur on nationality in relation to the succession of States indicated in his third report,3 States should ensure that they exercise their discretionary powers concerning nationality issues in a manner that is consistent with their international obligations in the field of human rights. 21. The right to a nationality implies the right of each individual to acquire, change and retain a nationality. The right to retain a nationality corresponds to the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality. As indicated above, an explicit and general prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality can be found in numerous international instruments. In particular, it is worth noting that article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights explicitly provides that no one should be arbitrarily deprived of his or her nationality. The General Assembly, in its resolution 50/152, also recognized the fundamental nature of the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality. 22. It is against this background that Human Rights Council resolution 10/13 should be understood, when the Council recognizes that arbitrary deprivation of nationality, especially on discriminatory grounds such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, constitutes a violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 23. While the question of arbitrary deprivation of nationality does not comprise the loss of nationality voluntarily requested by the individual, it covers all other forms of loss of nationality, including those that arbitrarily preclude a person from obtaining or retaining a nationality, particularly on discriminatory grounds, as well as those that automatically deprive a person of a nationality by operation of the law, and those acts taken by administrative authorities that result in a person being arbitrarily deprived of a nationality. 24. Concerning the notion of arbitrary deprivation, it should be recalled that the Human Rights Committee has shed light on the meaning of the concept of “arbitrary” in the context of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In its general comment No. 16, the Committee stated that the expression “arbitrary interference” was relevant to the protection of the right provided for in article 17. In the Committee’s view, the expression “arbitrary interference” could also extend to interference provided for under the law. The introduction of the concept of arbitrariness was intended to guarantee that even interference provided for by law should be in accordance with the provisions, aims and objectives of the 2 3 6 Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/61/10), chap. IV, commentary on article 4, para. 6. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1997, vol. II (1), p. 20. GE.09-17512