A/HRC/17/27 24. As set out in article 19, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, there are certain exceptional types of expression which may be legitimately restricted under international human rights law, essentially to safeguard the rights of others. This issue has been examined in the previous annual report of the Special Rapporteur.7 However, the Special Rapporteur deems it appropriate to reiterate that any limitation to the right to freedom of expression must pass the following three-part, cumulative test: (a) It must be provided by law, which is clear and accessible to everyone (principles of predictability and transparency); and (b) It must pursue one of the purposes set out in article 19, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, namely (i) to protect the rights or reputations of others, or (ii) to protect national security or of public order, or of public health or morals (principle of legitimacy); and (c) It must be proven as necessary and the least restrictive means required to achieve the purported aim (principles of necessity and proportionality). Moreover, any legislation restricting the right to freedom of expression must be applied by a body which is independent of any political, commercial, or other unwarranted influences in a manner that is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, and with adequate safeguards against abuse, including the possibility of challenge and remedy against its abusive application. 25. As such, legitimate types of information which may be restricted include child pornography (to protect the rights of children),8 hate speech (to protect the rights of affected communities),9 defamation (to protect the rights and reputation of others against unwarranted attacks), direct and public incitement to commit genocide (to protect the rights of others),10 and advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence (to protect the rights of others, such as the right to life).11 26. However, in many instances, States restrict, control, manipulate and censor content disseminated via the Internet without any legal basis, or on the basis of broad and ambiguous laws, without justifying the purpose of such actions; and/or in a manner that is clearly unnecessary and/or disproportionate to achieving the intended aim, as explored in the following sections. Such actions are clearly incompatible with States’ obligations under international human rights law, and often create a broader “chilling effect” on the right to freedom of opinion and expression. 27. In addition, the Special Rapporteur emphasizes that due to the unique characteristics of the Internet, regulations or restrictions which may be deemed legitimate and proportionate for traditional media are often not so with regard to the Internet. For example, in cases of defamation of individuals’ reputation, given the ability of the individual concerned to exercise his/her right of reply instantly to restore the harm caused, the types of sanctions that are applied to offline defamation may be unnecessary or disproportionate. 7 8 9 10 11 8 A/HRC/14/23, paras. 72 - 87. Dissemination of child pornography is prohibited under international human rights law, see e.g. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, art. 3, para. 1(c). See for example Faurisson v. France, United Nations Human Rights Committee, communication 550/1993, views of 8 November 1996. The issue of hate speech has also been addressed in previous reports, see inter alia E/CN.4/1999/64; E/CN.4/2000/63; E/CN.4/2002/75; and A/HRC/4/27. See for example article 3(c) of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. See for example article 20, paragraph 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.