A/HRC/8/3 page 18 5. Lessons learned from 26 years of reporting on commissions of inquiry 50. Experience demonstrates that, while commissions of inquiry tasked with examining alleged extrajudicial executions have much to recommend them in principle, in practice the balance sheet is often much less positive. Far too many of the commissions dealt with by the Special Rapporteur over the past 26 years have resulted in de facto impunity for all those implicated. 51. In essence, the problem is that commissions can be used very effectively by Governments for the wrong purposes: to defuse a crisis, to purport to be upholding notions of accountability and to promote impunity. The mere announcement by a Government of a commission is often taken at face value to mean that the Government is “doing something” to address impunity. Because a commission creates the appearance of government action, its announcement often prevents or delays international and civil society advocacy around the human rights abuses alleged. Moreover, an ineffective commission can be more than just a waste of time and resources; it can contribute to impunity by deterring other initiatives, monopolizing available resources and making subsequent endeavours to prosecute difficult or impossible. 52. These conclusions raise an important issue for the international community. How should international actors respond to announcements that commissions of inquiry are to be established? 53. The principal answer is that the international community should not, solely because a commission of inquiry has been established, suspend its engagement with the relevant Government when serious violations of human rights are alleged. International actors should assess from the outset whether the commission has been given the tools it would need to be able to address impunity effectively. The commission’s mandate, its membership, the process by which it was selected, its terms of appointment, the availability of effective witness-protection programmes and the provision of adequate staffing and funding should all be examined to ascertain whether the commission meets the relevant international standards. Experience demonstrates that the standards are more than just best practice guidelines: they are necessary preconditions for an investigation capable of addressing impunity. If they are not met in practice, a commission is highly unlikely to be effective. 54. If a commission is not established in accordance with international standards, the international community should not adopt a “wait and see” approach. Rather, it should promptly draw attention to the inadequacies and advocate implementation of necessary reforms. Where a Government appears to have a genuine will to establish an effective commission, but lacks the necessary expertise, funding or resources, international assistance will be appropriate. 55. A commission is not a substitute for a criminal prosecution.71 It does not have the powers of a court to declare the guilt or innocence of a person. It usually cannot order punishment for a wrongdoer. A commission’s role in terms of the State’s obligation to prosecute and punish is to gather evidence for a subsequent prosecution, identify perpetrators or recommend individuals for prosecution. If the commission’s mandate overlaps significantly with that of the regular criminal 71 E/CN.4/2004/7/Add.2, para. 86.