A/HRC/29/37 from a body monitoring one of the most documented conflicts in history.58 In conducting its special inquiry into the Al-Houla killings, for example, the Commission examined satellite imagery to review access points to an area where killings had occurred, as well as to review statements made by interviewees and to assess claims that the Government had razed civilian areas in Damascus and Hama.59 The Commission mentioned instances where it had received or found video evidence supporting allegations of torture or other forms of illtreatment or footage of killings, but noted when it could not verify those recordings. 60 Video material has also been directly gathered by the United Nations Supervision Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic and referred to in reports of the Commission.61 The Commission also undertook preliminary reviews and conducted forensic analyses of 26,948 photographs allegedly taken between 2011 and 2013 in government detention facilities. 62 In more recent reports, the Commission cited a number of videos that had been created and distributed by ISIS; those videos have been a challenge to the current methodology of using videos only to substantiate events for which there are other witness testimonies, but the Commission has given them weight as confessions.63 3. International criminal accountability 104. Information derived from digital sources has become increasingly important to international tribunals, including several of those established during the 1990s, and now also the International Criminal Court. In assessing the importance of such evidence to moving forward its work, the Court has been proactive in establishing working methods that can accommodate such evidence. In 2012 and 2013, the Court encouraged partners to exchange ideas and expertise on strategies to improve the capacity of investigators and prosecutors to gather and analyse digital evidence concerning serious international crimes. 64 105. One of the recommendations from that process was that the Office of the Prosecutor should “hire specialists trained in advanced cyberinvestigation techniques and familiar with cutting-edge technologies” and who would have “experience and credentials specific to digital investigations, including computer and smartphone forensics, online investigations, data storage and management, advanced cyberinvestigation techniques, and superior knowledge of digital security.” It was suggested that this would “go a long way toward building a robust in-house capacity for vetting digital data and extracting quality evidence.”65 On the basis of that consultation, the Office of the Prosecutor appointed a specialist in the verification of digital material to work as a “cyberinvestigator”, as part of its team of other investigators from legal and law enforcement backgrounds. 106. Recognizing the transient nature of much of the relevant material, the Office of the Prosecutor has adopted the practice of surveying digital evidence that is available when the preliminary examinations are opened. As noted above, the Court has developed guidelines for use by investigators concerning best practices with respect to the retrieval, storage and 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 20 See Marc Lynch, Deen Freelon and Sean Aday, Syria’s Socially Mediated Civil War (United States Institute of Peace, 2014). See A/HRC/21/50, annex IV; and A/HRC/22/59, annex XIII, para. 18. A/HRC/21/50, annex VIII, para. 31; A/HRC/22/59, annex V, para. 22. A/HRC/21/50, annex V, para. 14. A/HRC/27/60, para. 26. A/HRC/28/69 and Corr.1, annex II, paras. 21–25. See Human Rights Center, University of California, Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Using scientific evidence to advance prosecutions at the International Criminal Court (Berkeley, 2012); and Digital fingerprints: Using electronic evidence to advance prosecutions at the International Criminal Court (Berkeley, 2014). See Human Rights Center, Digital Fingerprints, p. 11 (see footnote 64).