A/HRC/3/2 page 30 97. The Commission is of the view that these acts, including suppressive fire or the destruction of empty buildings, could not be justified in terms of military necessity, particularly in view of the fact that IDF had ordered and witnessed the evacuation of the village, and would have known that all civilians had left. 98. On 30 July the Israeli Air Force (IAF) bombed a three-storey building in the town of Qana. As a result 29 civilians, including 17 children,72 were killed. This was the repetition of the tragic event of 18 April 1996, in which 100 Lebanese civilians were killed.73 The incident provoked extraordinary emotion, particularly in view of the number of victims. In a statement on 30 July 2006 to an emergency meeting of the Security Council, the Secretary-General urged it “to condemn the Israeli attack on the Qana” and called for an immediate cessation of hostilities74. On the same day the Security Council expressed shock and distress at Israeli shellings in Qana, strongly deplored loss of innocent lives in the conflict and requested the Secretary-General to report within one week on the tragic attack.75 The Secretary-General’s report of 7 August76 outlined events according to the Government of Israel and by the Government of Lebanon.77 99. The IAF Chief of Staff held a press conference on the attack on 30 July.78 This was followed by an official inquiry by the Israeli authorities published on 2 August 2006, which confirmed that “since July 12 over 150 rockets were launched from within the village and immediate surroundings. Residents had been warned several times to evacuate the area”.79 IAF stated that they had photographic evidence of the precision attacks, confirming that this particular building was hit at 0052 hrs by two bombs: the first exploded, while the second was a dud. The report states that “the building was attacked in accordance with their military guidelines regarding the use of fire against suspicious structures inside villages whose residents have been warned to evacuate and which were adjacent to areas where rockets are fired towards Israel (…). IDF operated on information the building was not inhabited by civilians and was being used as a hiding place for terrorists”.80 100. The Commission visited Qana and was informed that the members of two families, who normally lived elsewhere in the village, had moved into the building in question that night for shelter because it was one of the larger buildings in the area and had a reinforced basement. According to witnesses, two members of one family were Hezbollah fighters that had been killed in fighting elsewhere and therefore were not in Qana on 30 July. One survivor spoke of the ground swelling up beneath him and the building then collapsing.81 101. Following the attack, IDF reportedly continued to attack Qana. As a result, neither Lebanese Red Cross, Civil Defence teams, nor rescue services/UNIFIL were able to reach the house until 0900 hours that morning. IDF state that they first received reports of the incident around 0800-0830 hours. At the same time, IDF gave warnings to civilians to evacuate, although it was clear that the local inhabitants were too petrified to leave because of the continuous bombardment in Qana and on the routes leading away from it. In other words, the warnings could not be considered as being “effective” as required by international humanitarian law.82 102. The Commission did not receive any information to suggest that the building in question was being used as a Hezbollah missile launch site, either prior to or at the time of the attack, and that it therefore may have been a legitimate military target.83 The precautionary measures taken