A/HRC/4/99 page 10 available money and capacity, project finance is now often provided by emerging market players on their own or by large syndicates (in which an ECA might be approached in the later stages of a deal and given as little as 10 days for due diligence). The Special Representative was encouraged to recommend to relevant organizations such as the IFC and OECD that they account for how they are implementing their standards. There are currently a few discussions about coordination, for example between similar departments of different organizations and among multilateral institutions stating their intention to harmonize with the Principles. 33. There was also a discussion about the role of prescriptive standards or law in project finance. It was suggested that if the Principles had been too prescriptive they might have attracted the attention of anti-competitive lawyers; instead, they had to be a set of principles that financial institutions could aspire to and adapt to suit their own risk appetite and culture. Reference was made to the recent adoption by the Berne Union2 of a set of guiding principles, which are not binding but encompass OECD and non-OECD institutions. It was also suggested that guidelines work only for the well-intentioned, so binding laws are necessary. There was debate over whether scrutiny should be directed to principles themselves, the processes and mechanisms that underpin principles, FIs that adopt them, or FIs that have not adopted them. 34. There was a great deal of discussion about the impact on human rights of stabilization clauses in “host Government agreements”3 for project finance. The original intention of such clauses was to protect companies from discriminatory actions by host Governments, namely expropriation or punitive levies and taxes, but there was now concern that such clauses supersede existing and new legislation or may stifle both the ability of host Governments to introduce new measures to protect and promote human rights and access to justice for victims of human rights abuses. It was stressed that these agreements must not be used to circumvent the local legal system. Reference was made to a “human rights undertaking” by consortium members in a pipeline project whereby the consortium agreed not to resist local laws or claims from aggrieved citizens; and whereby the stabilization clause could be overridden in the case of the need to implement obligations under human rights, environmental, labour, or health and safety obligations. It was suggested that States would not challenge stabilization clauses because (a) they are often equity holders in the project and therefore have an interest in steady revenues and (b) such a challenge would be an admission that they had made a mistake when they negotiated the clauses. Participants agreed that more discussion and guidance on appropriate stabilization clauses and host Government agreements were necessary. 35. The question arose as to whether intermediary holding companies, established for project finance investments, could interfere with the protection and promotion of human rights. Some participants suggested that such holding companies and tax havens should be scrutinized, as they 2 The Berne Union is an organization of the international export credit and investment insurance industry. 3 A host Government agreement is a legal agreement between a foreign investor and the local government which is designed to reduce financial and political risks posed to investors by sudden changes in national law.

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