A/HRC/19/69 December 2011 (1,046 victims), January (1,196) and the first half of February 2012 (983) have been clearly the most violent period since the unrest erupted in March 2011. 26. The Government, on the one hand, and the opposition Syrian National Council, Syrian Revolutionary General Commission and local coordination committees, on the other, have consistently proclaimed their commitment to non-sectarianism while accusing the other side of instigating hatred. Attempts to mobilize political support have given rise to tensions and crimes with sectarian undertones, especially in Homs. On several occasions in January and February 2012, entire families – children and adults – were brutally murdered in Homs. On both sides, there is a pattern of abducting people not directly involved in the clashes for the purposes of revenge, ransom or as hostages. 27. Minorities‟ fears have been used to garner their support. Most Christians, for example, feel particularly vulnerable in the light of developments in some of the other countries in the region. Sectarian allegiances have also been invoked in calls to oppose the Government. Many Syrian citizens, including intellectuals and religious leaders of different creeds, have stood up for tolerance and denounced such politicking. C. International context 28. While the permanent members of the Security Council have continued to disagree on how to frame or address the crisis, regional organizations and individual States have continued to apply diplomatic pressure and introduced more sanctions. The European Union and the United States of America have hardened sanctions, in particular by imposing a boycott on the purchase of Syrian oil. Targeted sanctions have been imposed on a growing number of individuals and entities. Turkey banned transactions with the Government and its central bank, froze Government assets and imposed severe import duties on Syrian goods. 29. On 16 November, the League of Arab States called on the Government to cease violence and protect its citizens, release detainees, withdraw its forces from the cities, provide free access to Arab and international media and accept the deployment of an observer mission. The Government‟s initial refusal to sign a protocol agreeing to these terms led the League to adopt sanctions, halting among other things transactions with the Syrian Central Bank and imposing a travel ban on senior officials. 30. On 19 December, the Government signed the protocol, and on 24 December, the observer mission of the League of Arab States was deployed to the Syrian Arab Republic. After the mission filed its report, the League issued a resolution on 23 January 2012 calling for a transfer of authority from the President to his first vice-president and the formation of a national unity Government. The Government rejected this plan. Shortly afterwards, the League suspended the work of the mission, citing security concerns. 31. On 7 February, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation met with President Assad in Damascus to discuss proposals to address the crisis. 32. On 8 February, the Secretary-General of the United Nations evoked the prospect of resuming the observer mission as a joint operation of the League of Arab States and the United Nations. On 12 February, the League adopted a resolution calling on the Security Council to authorize a joint Arab-United Nations force to “supervise the execution of a ceasefire”, and urged its members to “halt all forms of diplomatic cooperation” with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. 33. Most in the international community have not favoured direct military intervention to protect the Syrian people. Available information, however, points to existing or planned support for either the Government or the opposition. A number of experts have begun to 9