A/HCR/41/44 irregular migrants and refugees to access many of their human rights, especially in the context of critical and emergency services. 63 Violations of several international human rights norms are implicated here and as such the ways in which some of these norms are violated by one or other type of the criminalization or suppression of such humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants will be discussed here. Right to life 36. This right is guaranteed in article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which provides that: “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law.” The suppression and criminalization of those who perform humanitarian rescues of irregular migrants or refugees at risk of death at sea contravenes this provision, as the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions has rightly pointed out in a recent report (A/73/314). If, as a human being, an irregular migrant or refugee is inherently entitled to a right to life that is protected by law, then criminalizing or suppressing any act designed to prevent the loss of life would amount to a violation of this entitlement. Few could therefore reasonably disagree that from an international human rights perspective, it is imperative to rescue those imperilled at sea.64 However, the “shadow and reality” of the criminal sanctions imposed on those who attempt to rescue irregular migrants in distress at sea has led such persons to second-guess themselves before rendering such assistance and this hesitation has often had grave consequences for the migrants and refugees whose lives are in danger. The dramatic rise in the deaths of irregular migrants and refugees along one border in North America since 1994 is illustrative.65 Right to liberty and the security of the person 37. The twin rights to liberty and the security of the person are guaranteed in article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It is well recognized in the jurisprudence of the courts of some countries, 66 as well as of the Human Rights Committee,67 that the ability of a migrant or refugee who faces threats in another country to the enjoyment of his or her fundamental human rights ( free from for example freedom from discrimination, torture or death) to secure protection in his or her host country engages the right to liberty and the security of the person. As such, the prosecution or suppression of humanitarians who, without any material gain to themselves, assist the entry into a country of such irregular migrants, assist irregular migrants with transportation within a country, or assist them with sanctuary in the host country, will violate those twin rights. Right to freedom of expression 38. The right to freedom of expression is guaranteed in article 19 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Thus, the prosecution or intimidation of humanitarians who participate in or support street protests in solidarity with irregular 63 64 65 66 67 12 Mark Provera, “The criminalization of irregular migration in the European Union”, pp. 27–28. See also Jennifer Allsopp, “Contesting fraternité: vulnerable migrants and the politics of protection in contemporary France” (Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, working paper No. 82, July 2012), pp. 5–6. See Brunilda Pali, “Europe as Terraferma: against the criminalization of solidarity” Security Praxis (May 2017). See Jill. M. Williams, “The safety/security nexus and the humanitarisation of border enforcement” The Geographical Journal, vol. 182, No. 1 (March 2016). See Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, Supreme Court of Canada, judgments (SCR 177, 4 April 1985), paras. 44–48, 52–53 and 59–60; Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), Supreme Court of Canada judgments (1 SCR. 3, 11 January 2002), paras. 75–78, 113–114 and 118–119; Medovarski v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and Esteban v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Supreme Court of Canada, judgments (2 SCR. 539, 2005 SCC 51, 30 September 2005), paras. 17 and 19– 22. See Said Hashi v. Denmark (CCPR/C/120/D/2470/2014), paras. 9.1–9.10; F.J. et al. v. Australia (CCPR/C/116/D/2233/2013), paras. 10.5–13; and X v. Denmark (CCPR/C/110/D/2007/2010), paras. 8.5 and 9.3.