A/HCR/41/44 28. It should be remembered, however, that most of the countries that have acted the most frequently to criminalize or suppress humanitarian rescues of migrants in distress at sea by NGOs or other private actors have argued that this approach will eventually lead to the minimization of migrant and refugee deaths at sea. Their contention is that such deaths will stop if their navies and criminal justice systems succeed in discouraging humanitarians from assisting irregular migrants who find themselves in distress at sea, leading in turn to these persons being discouraged from attempting to cross the Mediterranean and other bodies of water. For example, some European Union countries have argued that they have set up the Task Force Mediterranean to save lives at sea and that private individuals or groups who rescue migrants and refugees in distress at sea encourage others to attempt the crossing, making the task of the Task Force Mediterranean more difficult and leading to more deaths.51 There is, however, little evidence that this approach has been or can be effective in deterring the usually desperate attempts by irregular migrants and refugees to cross the Mediterranean Sea and enter Europe. 29. It should also be emphasized that some have argued that there may be a gap between the obligation to rescue migrants and refugees in distress at sea and the explicitly and clearly stated requirements of coastal States to allow disembarkation at their ports. 52 However, although some have argued that “it is doubtful that the right to assistance extends as far as the right to enter a particular port or sheltered waters,” 53 and have also contended that “even though the relevant rules of international law clearly apply to cases of physical distress, it cannot by extension be said to apply necessarily to vessels seeking entry to disembark persons who were rescued at sea,”54 basing this claim on the Tampa case of August 2001 where one country refused to allow the disembarkation of persons rescued at sea by a vessel.55 The Independent Expert firmly takes the contrary position. He is of the view that the relevant treaties could not have established the obligation to rescue persons in distress at sea without contemplating an implied requirement that such persons be allowed to disembark in as nearby a port as is practicable. 56 In any case, the logic and outcomes of the Cap Anamur and Morthada/el-Hedi cases provide strong support for his view on this question. 30. It should also be remembered that the general international legal duty to rescue persons in distress at sea (including migrants and refugees) is limited to ocean spaces. 57 There is no similar affirmative duty under international law to rescue persons who are in distress on land within the relevant countries of transit or destination. This point has been previously recognized by scholars.58 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 10 Ibid. See Richard Barnes, “The international law of the sea and migration control” and Natalie Klein, “International migration by sea and air,” in Foundations of International Migration Law Brian Opeskin, Richard Perruchoud and Jillyanne Redpath-Cross, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012). See Richard Barnes, “The international law of the sea and migration control”. Ibid. See Ruddock v. Vadarlis, FCA 1329 (September 2001). See also W. Kirtley, “The Tampa incident: the legality of Ruddock v. Vadarlis under international law and the implications of Australia’s new asylum policy”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 41, No. 1 (January 2002); Richard Barnes, “Refugee law at sea”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 53, No. 1 (January 2004); and Cecilia Bailliet, “The Tampa case and its impact on burden sharing at sea”, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 25, No. 3 (August 2003). See paragraphs 5 and 12 of resolution 1821 (2011) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. See also the rules for sea border operations annexed to Council Decision 2010/252/EU of 26 April 2010 supplementing the Schengen Borders Code as regards the surveillance of the sea external borders in the context of operational cooperation coordinated by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. See Shalini Bhargava Ray, “Saving lives”, Boston College Law Review, vol. 58, No. 4 (September 2017). Ibid.