A/HRC/13/37 to respond to terrorism threats. Most of these policies rely upon existing or new technologies, such as “bugs” and tracing technologies that can access the geographical position of mobile phones, technology that reports to Governments the contents of private text conversations of users of voice over Internet protocol,25 or that installs spyware on suspects’ computers in order to enable remote computer access.26 In some countries, security services have even proposed banning communication technologies that are more difficult to intercept, such as smartphones.27 The Special Rapporteur is also concerned about the tracking of cross-border communications without judicial authorization.28 22. In the name of countering terrorism, States have expanded initiatives to identify, scan and tag the general public through the use of multiple techniques which might violate an individual person’s right to privacy. When surveillance occurs of places and larger groups of people, the surveillance is typically subject to weaker regimes for authorization and oversight. Human rights standards have been tested, stretched and breached through the use of stop-and-searches; the compilation of lists and databases; the increased surveillance of financial, communications and travel data; the use of profiling to identify potential suspects; and the accumulation of ever larger databases to calculate the probability of suspicious activities and identify individuals seen as worthy of further scrutiny. More advanced techniques are applied as well, such as the collection of biometrics or the use of body scanners that can see through clothing.29 Some intrusions into people’s lives can be permanent as people’s physical and biographical details are frequently centralized in databases. (a) Stop and search powers 23. States have expanded their powers to stop, question, search and identify individuals, and have reduced their controls to prevent abuse of these powers. These powers have given rise to concerns regarding racial profiling and discrimination in Europe30 and the Russian Federation31 and concerns that these powers antagonize the relationship between citizens and the State. Equally, the proportionality requirement in the limitations test to the right to privacy raises questions whether blanket stop and search powers in designated security zones, such as in the Russian Federation32 or the United Kingdom,33 are really necessary in a democratic society. (b) The use of biometrics and dangers of centralized identity systems 24. A key component to new identity policies is the use of biometric techniques, such as facial recognition, fingerprinting and iris-scanning. While these techniques can, in some circumstances, be a legitimate tool for the identification of terrorist suspects, the Special 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 10 D. O’Brien, “Chinese Skype client hands confidential communications to eavesdroppers”, Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2 October 2008. See the article at the following address: http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2008/ 22719940_kw46_bka/index.html. S. Das Gupta and L. D’Monte, “BlackBerry security issue makes e-com insecure”, Business Standard, 12 March 2008. See, for instance, the Swedish Government’s bill on adjusted defence intelligence operations, adopted in June 2008, p. 83. See the European Parliament resolution of 23 October 2008 on the impact of aviation security measures and body scanners on human rights, privacy, personal dignity and data protection. Open Society Justice Initiative, Ethnic Profiling by Police in Europe, June 2005. Open Society Justice Initiative and JURIX, Ethnic Profiling in the Moscow Metro, June 2006. 2006 Federal Act No. 35 on Counteraction of Terrorism. See, e.g., United Kingdom Appeal Court, R. v. Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and another, 2006. GE.09-17804