A/HRC/2/7 page 12 systematic evidence of any type, however, it is impossible to confirm the validity of the claim that every target was a legitimate military objective or that the principle of distinction was respected.54 47. The same conclusion must be drawn regarding the reports of 12 destroyed and 38 severely damaged health facilities, notably in Bent Jbeil, Marjayoun and Nabatieh.55 Ambulances and medical convoys were, according to ICRC, also hit during the conflict.56 In the absence of concrete evidence to the contrary, it must be assumed that the health facilities and ambulances attacked were not legitimate targets. In this context it is important to stress that killing persons placed hors de combat is prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever.57 48. There are well-documented reports of IDF strikes on civilian convoys fleeing villages in the South as a result of IDF warnings, including that which killed 21 civilians fleeing Marwahin.58 Israel has generally not disputed that these strikes occurred or that deaths resulted, but it has argued that if civilian convoys were attacked it was justified by Hezbollah’s abuse of civilian convoys to move around fighters and materiel. The mission could not carry out any significant fact-finding to assess whether Hezbollah did in fact misuse the Marwahin or other convoys in this way. But it is important to note that the answer to this question would not by itself resolve the matter. To do so Israel would need to detail how many fighters were estimated to be among the civilians, the kind of materiel they were transporting, what precautions were taken to limit the impact of the strike on the civilians in the convoy, the concrete and direct military advantages anticipated at the time of attack and how did they outweighed the expected civilian casualties, and whether full consideration was given to other options designed to obtain the desired military effect. 3. Attacks on dual-use objects 49. The conflict was characterized, inter alia, by large-scale aerial attacks on parts of the Lebanese infrastructure, in particular roads and bridges.59 The mission notes that such attacks on the transportation infrastructure had a particularly debilitating effect on the safe transportation of IDPs, the provision of humanitarian assistance and access to medical care, and thus raises questions from a human rights perspective. Israel justifies these attacks with reference to the military use of these objects, turning them into so-called dual-use objects that can be legitimately attacked. 50. In characterizing objects, in particular objects that serve primarily civilian purposes, as legitimate military objectives (see para. 38 above), Israel relies heavily on the “list of categories of military objectives” included in the ICRC Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War (1956). The list is relevant, but it cannot be seen as the end point of an analysis. The current legal rule, adopted in Additional Protocol I and recognized as customary, not only requires that the targeted objects, due to “their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action”, but also demands that their “partial or total destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, [offer] a definite military advantage”. 60 The law in force thus imposes a test that requires an object-specific and context-specific assessment of each target rather than a test based on an object’s generic classification.