A/HRC/10/20 page 17 C. Availability of mechanisms of accountability 36. An investigation should also address the mechanisms of accountability evaluated in terms of jurisdictional competence and political plausibility if it determines that substantial grounds for holding individuals and other political actors criminally responsible exist. Since Israel is not a member of the International Criminal Court, the most efficient mechanism for assessing accountability would be to establish, under the authority of the Security Council, an ad hoc criminal tribunal for occupied Gaza, following the precedents of the 1990s (although this does not seem politically plausible under current conditions). It would also be theoretically possible for the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, to refer the situation to the Court for further action. It is arguable (although contested) that the General Assembly might establish such a tribunal by invoking its authority to “establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions”. Whether such an initiative is related to the functions of the Assembly is an unresolved matter. There is also some question as to whether the fact that the Security Council, in its resolution 1860 (2009), decided to remain seized of the matter makes its constitutionally inappropriate for the Assembly to take any action relating to the situation in Gaza resulting from the Israeli military operations. 37. Ideally, Israel, as the sovereign State exercising control over the territory where the alleged offences took place, should be the locus of judicial assessment, whether by its normal criminal law procedures or through the establishment of a special ad hoc process - but for the reasons previously discussed (see paragraph 7 above), this is extremely unlikely to take place. Nonetheless, human rights groups in Israel and occupied Palestine are compiling as much information as possible relating to allegations of war crimes to provide the legal grounds for recourse to national legal systems. 38. From the outlook of competence and plausibility, the most available accountability initiatives are associated with national criminal law procedures in those countries, such as Belgium and Spain, that give to their courts legal authority to prosecute war crimes under the rubric of universal jurisdiction, provided that the accused individual is physically present. It is likely that such an option would be influenced by the existence of a persuasive report under the auspices of the United Nations that recommended accountability. 39. The above-mentioned situation has led the Minister for Justice of Israel, Daniel Friedman, to be designated to protect any Israeli detained abroad in accordance with the public pronouncement made by Prime Minister Olmert at a gathering of military officers a few days after the Gaza ceasefire went into effect: “The Government will stand like a fortified wall to protect each and every one of you from allegations.” Israel also warned that it would retaliate in the event that Israelis are arrested and charged abroad. Note that potential initiatives in national judicial settings are not limited to battlefield specific offences, but can be extended to encompass alleged crimes at the highest political and military levels of Government. The case involving the indictment of the former head of State of Chile, Auguste Pinochet, adjudicated these issues in the Spanish and British legal systems, as well as in Chile itself, during the late 1990s and early 2000s.