A/HRC/42/43/Add.2 children. However, there are deficiencies in terms of coverage and the amount of benefits allocated.25 60. The Government’s basic social subsidy programme (Programa de Subsídio Social Básico) is essentially an unconditional cash transfer targeting poor households with no labour capacity. The cash transfers are the most important source of household income for older persons. Most of the cash is spent on food, but is also used to prioritize health-care expenditure.26 61. Although the cash transfer programme has been rapidly expanded to target extremely poor households in which no adult is able to work, such as those in which the adults are older persons or persons with disabilities, it does not cover all communities within each district or region (A/HRC/26/28/Add.1, para. 70). 62. In the new National Strategy for Basic Social Security 2016–2024, it is proposed that household poverty targeting be replaced with categorical targeting based on life-course risks identified as old age, disability and childhood. The Government proposes to provide old-age grants to 90 per cent of older people aged 60 and above by 2024. That could benefit approximately 1 million older Mozambicans. 63. The scheme has rigid eligibility criteria based on incapacity to work and generate an income, health status, age, nationality and residency status. Potential candidates are proposed to the National Institute for Social Action, the government agency responsible for delivering the scheme, by so-called permanentes, volunteer community liaison officers who receive a minimal stipend. Officially, they should be selected by their local community to liaise with the Institute, which is mandated to carry out a household visit to verify eligibility using a simple means test. In reality, however, it lacks the human resources to make more than a few visits.27 64. Conditions for social protection coverage are not uniform across districts and a determination of eligibility in one district may not be respected in another. Often there is little or no coordination between the National Institute for Social Action and community liaison officers tasked with assisting in the identification of beneficiaries and informing them of payment dates. Owing to logistical and budgetary constraints, beneficiaries are often informed of payment dates for monthly payments only a day or two in advance, limiting collection possibilities for many households. A general lack of awareness of the procedures and processes often prevents eligible beneficiaries from accessing payments (ibid.). 65. The need for an identity card in order to be registered for the cash transfer programme constitutes a further barrier to the enjoyment of older persons of the right to social security. In Gaza Province, for instance, 40 per cent of older persons do not have identity cards and for that reason they cannot be registered for the cash transfer programme.28 66. The community liaison officers provide a contact point for anyone wishing to make a complaint about the basic social subsidy programme. However, guidelines on how recipients can make a complaint are not clear and the system faces significant challenges. There are concerns about the selection of the community liaison officers, raising questions about their objectivity. Moreover, they are involved in selecting the recipients for the subsidy, which creates a conflict of interest and results in a reluctance to submit complaints for fear of reprisals. In the event that community liaison officers want to make a referral on behalf of recipients, they may be put off by lack of resources.29 25 26 27 28 29 See ILO, Social Protection for Older Persons (2014). See HelpAge, “Cash transfers and older people’s access to healthcare” (2017), p. 18. See HelpAge, “Voice and accountability in social protection: lessons from social pensions in Africa” (2018), p. 20. HelpAge International Mozambique, baseline report for the programme “Responsibility between generations: older people promoting governance” (2009). See HelpAge, “Voice and accountability in social protection”, p. 26. 11