A/HRC/41/41 3. Necessary and proportionate to protect a legitimate objective 49. Articles 21 and 22 (2) of the Covenant require that restrictions against the freedom of assembly or of association be necessary and proportionate in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. It has been indicated, under this special procedure mandate, that the word “necessary” means that there must be a pressing social need ‟for the interference”. When such a pressing social need arises, States have then to ensure that any restrictive measures fall within the limit of what is acceptable in a democratic society, which “only exists where pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness are in place”.71 The onus of establishing this justification always rests on the State. 50. States often impede the exercise of the freedoms of assembly and association online through restrictions that are not necessary or proportionate considering the specific threats invoked. Some examples of this include network disruptions, State-mandated blocking of online content, social media tax, and surveillance using digital technologies. Network disruptions 51. According to data,72 at least 40 network disruptions were identified in connection with public demonstrations and peaceful protests in 2018, with 37 in 2017 and 27 in 2016. The regions most affected are Asia and Africa, with cases of Internet shutdowns or social media bans reported in India, 73 the Islamic Republic of Iran, 74 Chad, 75 Cameroon 76 and Togo.77 India alone accounts for 64 network disruptions related to public demonstrations between 2016 and 2018. Network disruptions amid peaceful assemblies have been reported in other regions of the world, demonstrating that this has become a dangerous global trend. The number of network disruptions and social media bans during elections has also been on the rise since 2016, severely affecting political opposition parties’ and social movements’ visibility and capacity to mobilize support at a crucial time. These measures affect the capacity of human rights defenders to carry out their work and document human rights abuses.78 52. The Special Rapporteur believes network shutdowns are in clear violation of international law and cannot be justified in any circumstances. Shutdowns fail to meet the established test for restrictions on the right to peaceful assembly found in article 21, and for restrictions on the right to freedom of association under article 22 (2), of the Covenant. In most cases, network shutdown orders lack a legal basis. Where a legal basis does exist, shutdown orders are often coupled with broad and vague provisions and lack adequate independent oversight.79 While these measures are typically justified on grounds of national security and public order, they are a disproportionate – and generally ineffective – means of achieving those legitimate aims. 53. These extreme measures generate a wide variety of harms to human rights, economic activity, public safety and emergency services that outweigh the purported benefits. Network disruptions often backfire and cause chaos and unrest. In the context of protests and elections, when tensions are at their highest, these tools are actually needed to prevent disinformation and dispel rumours, as well as to protect the rights to liberty and personal integrity, by allowing access to emergency help and contact with family and 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 A/HRC/20/27, para. 17. Access Now, #KeepitOn campaign, and Shutdown Tracker Optimization Project (STOP). See IND 5/2016, IND 3/2017 and IND 7/2017. See IRN 1/2018. See TCD 3/2016. See CMR 1/2018. See TGO 1/2017. A/68/299, para. 28. See A/HRC/29/25/Add.2. 13