A/HRC/41/35/Add.3 could be instrumental in encouraging a “race to the top” to fulfill the corporate responsibility to respect human rights.” (Sarah McKune, 9) As the main report illustrates, the private military and security company (PMSC) industry offers a model for multistakeholder governance. (Id.) Ultimately, however, it is questionable whether the UN Guiding Principles provide a sufficient framework. It was suggested that “if industry participants consider that they cannot address human rights impacts without ultimately rendering their business unprofitable, perhaps that is a sign that digital espionage functions should remain inherent to the state and out of the hands of the private sector.” (Id.) VIII. Remedies 43. The submissions go into detail about the lack of effective remedial mechanisms available to individuals harmed by the use of surveillance technologies. States consistently fail to investigate complaints of wrongdoing by private surveillance companies. (Amnesty International, 7) In the rare instance that inter-governmental bodies investigate complaints, they lack the ability to compel companies to cooperate or enforce their recommendations. For example, a joint civil society complaint before the U.K. National Contact Point of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) triggered an investigation into the practices of Gamma Group, the firm that produced Finfisher. Although the U.K. National Contact Point found that “Gamma’s conduct was inconsistent with its responsibilities under the OECD Guidelines, it was unable to confirm that Gamma caused or contributed to the human rights abuses alleged.” Its investigation was limited in part because Gamma refused to cooperate. (Id., 7) 44. It is frequently difficult to identify an appropriate legal remedy for surveillancerelated harms, and even where there is a remedy, there is no meaningful means of enforcement. (Id.) In the context of litigation, “[u]ncertain jurisdiction, corporate liability shields, sovereign immunity, lack of technical evidence, restrictive contracts, and official impunity” routinely deny victims effective legal remedies. It may also be difficult to articulate or quantify the harms individuals suffer as a result of digital surveillance, since these often transpire as “fear, uncertainty and actions not taken.” (GJC, 12) Nevertheless, documented chilling effects and financial costs associated with technical circumvention measures may create bases for remedy. (Id.) 45. Government secrecy frequently stands in the way of an effective remedy. Restrictions on the public disclosure of information regarding government surveillance activities, such as those prohibiting service providers to disclose “information about government requests and orders” under India’s Information Technology Act Rules, hinder investigations into surveillance-related abuses. (CIS, 4; see also CELS, 4) Domestic laws that authorize government surveillance on wide ranging national security grounds also effectively immunize them from legal accountability. (Bytes for All, 2 - 3) 46. A few submissions explored the possibility of remedies other than litigation. Guarantees of non-recurrence may be a critical and appropriate remedy in the context of digital surveillance. (GJC, 12) States should also ensure that “authorities charged with overseeing the export of surveillance technologies have sufficient authority, independence and transparency to ensure adequate scrutiny of human rights risks.” (Amnesty International, 9) International bodies, including human rights mechanisms, should undertake further research and analysis into how the right to effective remedies can be vindicated in this context. (GJC, 12) 11