A/HRC/43/3/Add.2 34. Lack of adherence to principles and procedures for transfers established in the law on the penitentiary system continued. Transfers continued to be made without notification to the families of the detainees and to the criminal enforcement judges.28 The principle that inmates should be assigned to centres close to their family is frequently violated. 29 Decisions by criminal enforcement judges are often not implemented by the National Penitentiary Institute, or only with significant delays, as illustrated in the case of seven human rights defenders, who were held at the penitentiary centre of Morocelí from 3 September to 30 October 2019, despite a judicial order of 1 September for their transfer to the Olanchito centre. 35. Article 245 of the 2019 General Budget Act, whereby the relatives of persons deprived of liberty were exempted from paying for the documents necessary for the issuance of a visiting card, was often not adhered to. The visiting regulations process consequently remained long, costly and complex for many families. 36. The National Committee for the Prevention of Torture continued to face challenges in the implementation of its mandate. Weaknesses in the normative and administrative framework that hamper the independence and autonomy of the mechanism, including internal allocation of resources, remained unaddressed (A/HRC/40/3/Add.2, para. 38). With a budget representing 0.006 per cent of the national budget, the Committee was unable to strengthen its presence outside the capital, to support local committees and to hire technical staff, such as psychologists. Moreover, there are concerns related to the fulfilment of its mandate, considering that so far there has been no agreement either on the appointment or on the swearing-in of the Commissioners by the President, as required by law, including the Commissioner elected by civil society.30 37. In September, in his annual report to the Human Rights Council, the SecretaryGeneral reported on reprisals against the civil society Commissioner on the National Committee for the Prevention of Torture for her cooperation with the United Nations, which took the form of demeaning comments from public officials, including members of Congress, undermining her position and work (A/HRC/42/30, para. 56). V. Justice A. Judicial independence 38. The establishment of an independent governance structure for the judiciary and the strengthening of the judicial career are urgent priorities and require increased political commitment. In the course of 2019, the Supreme Court produced an initial text of the laws on the judicial council, the judicial career and the organic law of the judiciary, with significant technical assistance from international donors. International and regional mechanisms have for several years consistently expressed concern vis-à-vis the current framework, which they considered to be obsolete and inadequate, and hampering judicial independence (A/HRC/34/3/Add.2, para. 23, and CCPR/C/HND/CO/2, para. 34).31 39. The current framework, which has gaps in the regulation of appointments and promotions within the judicial career, leaves the judicial system exposed to interference by the executive and the legislature. The adoption of legislation regarding the appointment of high judicial officials is crucial, notably to prevent interference by the legislature (A/HRC/40/3/Add.2, para. 40). 28 29 30 31 8 Law on the national penitentiary system, art. 92. Ibid., art. 66. The mandate of the previous Commissioners expired on 16 September 2019. There are three Commissioners in total, with one designated by the executive, one by the legislature and one by civil society. See also López Lone y otros vs. Honduras, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, judgment of 5 October 2015, available from www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_302_esp.pdf (in Spanish).