A/HRC/20/14 31. The suggested link between poverty and terrorism is controversial. 47 However, in the Special Rapporteur’s view, there are at least “patterns of correlation” suggesting that societies characterized by economic, social, political and educational exclusion “are often breeding, or recruitment, grounds for terrorism” (A/HRC/6/17, para. 64). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has suggested that efforts at terrorism prevention should focus on grievances arising from inequality and social exclusion.48 32. Finally, in this connection, the Special Rapporteur strongly believes that human rights-compliant counter-terrorism measures help to prevent the recruitment of individuals to acts of terrorism (A/HRC/16/51, para. 12). Human rights abuses have all too often contributed to the grievances which cause people to make the wrong choices and to resort to terrorism. Singling out communities and disproportionately addressing law enforcement measures against them entails the risk of collective alienation. States that have derogated from their human rights obligations on grounds of national emergency, or resorted to military responses in countering terrorism, have witnessed an erosion of institutional, procedural and substantive safeguards. The collective commitment of the international community to protect the rights of potential future victims of terrorism necessarily entails an equally resolute commitment to the principles of international human rights law in the conception and implementation of counter-terrorism strategies. States’ adjectival obligation to conduct an independent and impartial investigation B. 33. Article 15 of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism recognizes States’ duty to investigate the facts of an alleged terrorist crime and, where appropriate, to prosecute or extradite the alleged perpetrator. With the increasingly transnational character of terrorist networks, there has been a corresponding evolution of cross-border cooperation and mutual legal assistance in the investigation and prosecution of terrorist suspects. States are now obliged to cooperate with one another in transnational counter-terrorist investigations (including in the arrest and detention of suspects), in responding to requests for mutual legal assistance and in extraditing suspects and fugitives.49 These obligations, however, take effect subject to States’ a priori international obligations to refuse such assistance where it would expose an individual to a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment50 or to a “flagrant denial of justice.”51 47 48 49 50 51 10 pdfs/web_wg_preventing_resolving_conflicts_guidance_for_mediators.pdf. CTITF, “First Report of the Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism: Inventory of State Programmes,” para. 20, available at http://www.un.org/terrorism/pdfs/ radicalization.pdf; see also A/59/2005, para. 16. OECD, A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorist Prevention: Key Entry Points for Action, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series (OECD, 2003), pp. 8-9, available at http://www.oecd.org/ dataoecd/17/4/16085708.pdf. See UNODC, Manual on International Cooperation in Criminal Matters related to Terrorism (New York, 2009), Module 1.B and 1.C. See ECHR, Soering v. The United Kingdom, no. 14038/88; and, concerning intelligence agencies’ cooperation with States known to practice torture, see HM Government, “Consolidated Guidance to Intelligence Officers and Service Personnel on the Detention and Interviewing of Detainees Overseas, and on the Passing and Receipt of Intelligence Relating to Detainees” (United Kingdom, July 2010). This Guidance was considered by the Administrative Court of the High Court of Justice of England and Wales in Equality and Human Rights Commission v Prime Minister & Ors [2011] EWHC 2401 (Admin) (3 October 2011), which held that cooperation with the interrogation of a suspect by another State would always be unlawful when “hooding” is used. See ECHR, Othman (Abu Qatada) v. The United Kingdom, no. 8139/09.