A/HRC/19/57 follows that liberty is recognized as a principle and detention as an exception in the interests of justice. 55. The rationale in paragraph 3 of article 9 also indicates that alternative measures including house arrest, judicial monitoring, release on bail shall not be regarded as compulsory vis-à-vis a pretrial detention but rather optional. The consideration of alternative non-custodial measures allows it to be ascertained whether the principles of necessity and proportionality have been met. 56. The provisions contained in paragraph 3 of article 9 of the Covenant can be summarized as follows: Any detention must be exceptional and of short duration and a release may be accompanied by measures intended only to ensure representation of the defendant in judicial proceedings. 57. The Working Group expresses its desire that the present understanding of paragraph 3 of article 9 of the Covenant be commonly subscribed to and invites States to further promote it among agents responsible for the application of the law, with a view to contributing to the eradication of unjustified and prolonged pretrial detention, which constitutes arbitrary deprivation of liberty. 58. The above position finds further support in the presumption of innocence and individual liberty equally recognized in the Covenant. Finally, it should be noted that the rule contained in article 9 is applicable only to criminal procedure and not civil procedure. B. Habeas corpus 59. Since its second report, which covered the activities in 1992, the Working Group has repeatedly addressed the issue of habeas corpus. 1 It has consistently emphasized that habeas corpus is, in itself, a human right, as may be inferred from a careful reading of articles 8, 9 and 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and more explicitly, article 9, paragraph 4, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which provides that: “anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.” The Working Group maintains that habeas corpus “should be regarded not as a mere element in the right to a fair trial but ... as a personal right” (E/CN.4/2004/3, para. 62). Similarly, principle 32 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment provides that a detained person or his counsel “shall be entitled at any time to take proceedings according to domestic law” for the same purposes. This is also the understanding of the Human Rights Committee in its general comment No. 8, paragraph 1, which prescribes that “the important guarantee laid down in paragraph 4, i.e. the right to control by a court of the legality of the detention, applies to all persons deprived of their liberty by arrest or detention”. 60. Moreover, States parties have the obligation, in accordance with article 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, to ensure that an effective remedy is provided to any person whose rights as recognized therein are violated; and they have that obligation specifically in any 1 See the reports of the Working Group, documents E/CN.4/1993/24, para. 43 (c); E/CN.4/1994/27, para. 36; E/CN.4/1995/31, para. 45; E/CN.4/1996/40, paras. 110 and 124 (5); E/CN.4/2004/3, paras. 62, 85 and 87; E/CN.4/2005/6, paras. 47, 61, 63–64, 75 and 78; A/HRC/7/4, paras. 64, 68 and 82 (a); A/HRC/10/21, paras. 53–54 and 73; A/HRC/13/30, paras. 71, 76–80, 92 and 96. 18