A/HRC/26/32 importance when a Government initiated disciplinary proceedings against a judge in his or her capacity as President of the Supreme Court.10 82. In Chocrón Chocrón v. Venezuela, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights sustained that any disciplinary removal procedure could only be admissible in the context of a disciplinary procedure or a duly-founded administrative decision. The Court highlighted that the obligation to found decisions is a guarantee related to the correct administration of justice, which protects the right of the people to be tried for the reasons established by law and grants credibility to judicial decisions in a democratic society.11 83. In Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, the European Court of Human Rights established that the applicant, a former judge, had been dismissed in violation of the fundamental principles of procedural fairness enshrined in article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, such as the principles of an independent and impartial tribunal and legal certainty, and the right to be heard by a tribunal established by law. The Court noted that the violations found in the case suggested that the system of judicial discipline did not ensure sufficient separation of the judiciary from other branches of State power and did not provide appropriate guarantees against abuse and misuse of disciplinary measures to the detriment of judicial independence.12 In Olujić v. Croatia, the Court ruled that, in order to establish whether a body can be considered independent, regard must be had, inter alia, to the manner of appointment of its members and to their term of office, to the existence of guarantees against outside pressure and to the question of whether the body presents an appearance of independence. The Court concluded by emphasizing that independence and impartiality are essential in disciplinary proceedings.13 84. In order to safeguard the independence of justice operators, accountability mechanisms and proceedings must therefore have a restricted application. In relation to judges, international standards state that disciplinary measures and sanctions against them can be triggered only for reasons of incapacity or behaviour that render them unfit to discharge their duties and in cases provided for by the law.14 As a result, judges should not be removed or punished for bona fide errors or for disagreeing with a particular interpretation of the law.15 Judges and prosecutors can be justifiably disciplined, suspended or removed from office for persistent failure to perform their duties, habitual intemperance, wilful misconduct in office, conduct which brings judicial office into disrepute or substantial violation of judicial ethics. In particular, justice operators must be duly held to account when engaged in corrupt practices. Indeed, judicial independence and immunity do not mean impunity and irresponsibility. 85. The Human Rights Committee has confirmed that position by expressing concern at cases of widespread corruption in the justice system. It has recommended that States parties take measures to eradicate corruption by investigating, prosecuting and punishing alleged perpetrators, including judges who may be complicit.16 It has further stated that if 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Application No. 58688/11, final judgment of 20 February 2013, paras. 132–133. Judgment of 1 July 2011, paras. 117–118. Application No. 21722/11, judgment of 9 January 2013, paras. 199 and 205. Application No. 22330/05, judgment 5 May 2009, para. 38. Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, principle 18. International Commission of Jurists, 2007, p. 55. See, for example, CCPR/C/TKM/CO/1, para. 13; CCPR/C/CPV/CO/1, para. 15; CCPR/C/PRY/CO/3, para. 23. 15