A/HRC/30/42 as imprescriptibility. 28 Other courts have carried out judicial processes using criminal types that may have not been present in national codes when the acts were committed, arguing that this does not violate the principle of legality if international law already declared the acts in question to be illegal when they were committed. 29 Indeed, domestic and international courts have found ways to guarantee simultaneously respect to the principle of legality as well as due process and fair trial standards for the defendants, and to the rights of victims to see the perpetrators of violations brought to justice. 30 2. Emergency, security and counter-terrorism legislation 51. Another crucial legislative reform that is not particularly onerous in terms of expenses or complexity is to ensure that emergency, anti -terrorism or other securityrelated legislation is fully compatible with human rights standards, so that it does not incentivize violations of rights. Authoritarian regimes, regimes mired in conflict and , for years now, States involved in so-called “wars on terrorism” almost invariably adopt legislation that goes well beyond the objective security needs that purportedly motivate it. 31 Such laws have been seriously misused to justify gross human rights violations. For example, in addition to allowing for prolonged periods of “preventive” detention, constraining access to defence lawyers, the absence of the review of the legality of detention by a court, among other limitations of rights, these laws either directly or indirectly promote, even instigate, the violation of rights. This is the case, for example, with the singly objectionable, jointly pernicious, removal of bars on the use of evidence that may have been obtained illegally, frequently by coercion, and the weakening of the safeguards under which “confessions” can be given by detainees. D. Judicial reforms 52. Given the importance of an independent and effective judiciary in secu ring rights — but also of acknowledging the dubious role some judiciaries have played in pre-transitional periods in some countries — it is somewhat surprising that judicial reform has not played a more prominent role in discussions about guarantees of non recurrence. This is in spite of recommendations made by many truth commissions in relation to judicial reform and the fact that many transitional countries have reformed their justice systems. 32 This serves as a good illustration of the lack of focus and strategy in discussions about guarantees of non -recurrence, and of the disconnect between transitional justice and other policy interve ntions with which it coexists but rarely interacts. 53. In the aftermath of mass violations, committed sometimes with the collaboration of the judiciary, or in any case having shown itself an insufficient bulwark against the violations, there are three important issues that should be tackled in order to help prevent future violations: (a) screening judicial personnel; (b) 28 29 30 31 32 See Arancibia Clavel and Simón (Supreme Court, Argentina); and Fujimori (Specialized Criminal Law Chamber, Peru). See Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Appeals Chamber, STL-11-01/I, paras.132 and 133; Pérez García (Colombia). See Scilingo and Pinochet (National High Criminal Court, Spain); Gelman. See A/HRC/16/51/Add.2; and A/HRC/25/59/Add.2. See Linn A. Hammergren, Justice Reform and Development: Rethinking Donor Assistance to Developing and Transitional Countries (Routledge, Oxford, 2014). 13