A/HRC/23/47 may result in a LAR deciding to launch an attack based not merely on incomplete but also on flawed understandings of the circumstances.52 It should be recognized, however, that this happens to humans as well. 72. Proportionality is widely understood to involve distinctively human judgement. The prevailing legal interpretations of the rule explicitly rely on notions such as “common sense”, “good faith” and the “reasonable military commander standard.” 53 It remains to be seen to what extent these concepts can be translated into computer programmes, now or in the future. 73. Additionally, proportionality assessments often involve qualitative rather than quantitative judgements.54 74. In view of the above, the question arises as to whether LARs are in all cases likely (on the one hand) or never (on the other) to meet this set of cumulative standard. The answer is probably less absolute, in that they may in some cases meet them (e.g. in the case of a weapons system that is set to only return fire and that is used on a traditional battlefield) but in other cases not (e.g. where a civilian with a large piece of metal in his hands must be distinguished from a combatant in plain clothes). Would it then be possible to categorize the different situations, to allow some to be prohibited and others to be permitted? Some experts argue that certain analyses such as proportionality would at least initially have to be made by commanders, while other aspects could be left to LARs. 55 D. Legal responsibility for LARs 75. Individual and State responsibility is fundamental to ensure accountability for violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law. Without the promise of accountability, deterrence and prevention are reduced, resulting in lower protection of civilians and potential victims of war crimes. 56 76. Robots have no moral agency and as a result cannot be held responsible in any recognizable way if they cause deprivation of life that would normally require accountability if humans had made the decisions. Who, then, is to bear the responsibility? 77. The composite nature of LAR technology and the many levels likely to be involved in decisions about deployment result in a potential accountability gap or vacuum. Candidates for legal responsibility include the software programmers, those who build or sell hardware, military commanders, subordinates who deploy these systems and political leaders. 78. Traditionally, criminal responsibility would first be assigned within military ranks. Command responsibility should be considered as a possible solution for accountability for 52 53 54 55 56 14 Krishnan, (see note 31 above), pp. 98-99. Tonya Hagmaier et al, “Air force operations and the law: A guide for air, space and cyber forces” p. 21, available from http://www.afjag.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-100510-059.pdf; Andru Wall “Legal and Ethical Lessons of NATO‟s Kosovo Campaign” p. xxiii, available from http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/kosovo_legal.pdf Markus Wagner “The Dehumanization of International Humanitarian Law: Legal, Ethical, and Political Implications of Autonomous Weapon Systems” (2012), available from http://robots.law.miami.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2012/01/Wagner_Dehumanization_of_international_humanitarian_law.pdf note 96 and accompanying text. Benjamin Kastan “Autonomous Weapons Systems: A Coming Legal „Singularity‟?” University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology and Policy (forthcoming 2013), p. 18 and further, available from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2037808 Human Rights Watch (see note 7 above), pp. 42-45.