A/HRC/23/47 33. As with any technology that revolutionizes the use of lethal force, little may be known about the potential risks of the technology before it is developed, which makes formulating an appropriate response difficult; but afterwards the availability of its systems and the power of vested interests may preclude efforts at appropriate control. 9 This is further complicated by the arms race that could ensue when only certain actors have weapons technology. The current moment may be the best we will have to address these concerns. In contrast to other revolutions in military affairs, where serious reflection mostly began after the emergence of new methods of warfare, there is now an opportunity collectively to pause, and to engage with the risks posed by LARs in a proactive way. This report is a call for pause, to allow serious and meaningful international engagement with this issue. 34. One of the reasons for the urgency of this examination is that current assessments of the future role of LARs will affect the level of investment of financial, human and other resources in the development of this technology over the next several years. Current assessments – or the lack thereof – thus risk to some extent becoming self-fulfilling prophesies. 35. The previous Special Rapporteur examined LARs in a report in 2010,10 calling inter alia for the convening of an expert group to consider robotic technology and compliance with international human rights and humanitarian law. 11 The present report repeats and strengthens that proposal and calls on States to impose national moratoria on certain activities related to LARs. 36. As with UCAVs and targeted killing, LARs raise concerns for the protection of life under the framework of IHRL as well as IHL. The Special Rapporteur recalls the supremacy and non-derogability of the right to life under both treaty and customary international law.12 Arbitrary deprivation of life is unlawful in peacetime and in armed conflict. A. The emergence of LARs 1. Definitions 37. While definitions of the key terms may differ, the following exposition provides a starting point.13 38. According to a widely used definition (endorsed inter alia by both the United States Department of Defense and Human Rights Watch14), the term LARs refers to robotic weapon systems that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further 9 10 11 12 13 14 David Collingridge, The Social Control of Technology (Frances Pinter, 1980). A/65/321. A/65/321, pp. 10-22. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6, enshrining the right to life, and art. 4 (2) on its non-derogability. Arkin (see note 8 above), p. 7; Noel Sharkey AutomatingWarfare: lessons learned from the drones, p. 2, available from http://www.alfredoroma.it/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Automated-warfareNoel-Sharkey.pdf; Patrick Lin et al, Autonomous Military Robotics: Risk, Ethics, and Design (San Luis Obispo, California Polytechnic State University, 2008) p. 4, available from http://ethics.calpoly.edu/ONR_report.pdf US Department of Defense Directive, “Autonomy in Weapons Systems”, Number 3000.09 of 21 November 2012, Glossary Part II. See also United Kingdom Ministry of Defence “The UK Approach to Unmanned Aircraft Systems” paras. 202-203, available from https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/jdn-2-11-the-uk-approach-to-unmanned-aircraftsystems; see also, Human Rights Watch (see note 7 above), p. 2. 7