A/HRC/23/47 longstanding and binding rule of IHL, specifically demands the application of “the principle of humanity” in armed conflict. 68 Taking humans out of the loop also risks taking humanity out of the loop. 90. According to philosopher Peter Asaro, an implicit requirement can thus be found in IHL for a human decision to use lethal force, which cannot be delegated to an automated process. Non-human decision-making regarding the use of lethal force is, by this argument, inherently arbitrary, and all resulting deaths are arbitrary deprivations of life.69 91. The contemplation of LARs is inextricably linked to the role of technology in the world today. While machines help to make many decisions in modern life, they are mostly so used only where mechanical observation is needed (e.g. as a line umpire in sporting events) and not in situations requiring value judgements with far-reaching consequences (e.g. in the process of adjudication during court cases). As a more general manifestation of the importance of person-to-person contact when important decisions are taken, legal systems around the world shy away from trials in absentia. Of course, robots already affect our lives extensively, including through their impact on life and death issues. Robotic surgery is for example a growing industry and robots are increasingly used in rescue missions after disasters.70 Yet in none of these cases do robots make the decision to kill and in this way LARs represent an entirely new prospect. 92. Even if it is assumed that LARs – especially when they work alongside human beings – could comply with the requirements of IHL, and it can be proven that on average and in the aggregate they will save lives, the question has to be asked whether it is not inherently wrong to let autonomous machines decide who and when to kill. The IHL concerns raised in the above paragraphs relate primarily to the protection of civilians. The question here is whether the deployment of LARs against anyone, including enemy fighters, is in principle acceptable, because it entails non-human entities making the determination to use lethal force. 93. This is an overriding consideration: if the answer is negative, no other consideration can justify the deployment of LARs, no matter the level of technical competence at which they operate. While the argument was made earlier that the deployment of LARs could lead to a vacuum of legal responsibility, the point here is that they could likewise imply a vacuum of moral responsibility. 94. This approach stems from the belief that a human being somewhere has to take the decision to initiate lethal force and as a result internalize (or assume responsibility for) the cost of each life lost in hostilities, as part of a deliberative process of human interaction. This applies even in armed conflict. Delegating this process dehumanizes armed conflict even further and precludes a moment of deliberation in those cases where it may be feasible. Machines lack morality and mortality, and should as a result not have life and death powers over humans. This is among the reasons landmines were banned. 71 95. The use of emotive terms such as “killer robots” may well be criticized. However, the strength of the intuitive reactions that the use of LARs is likely to elicit cannot be ignored. Deploying LARs has been depicted as treating people like “vermin”, who are 68 69 70 71 Geneva Convention Protocol I, art. 1(2). See also the preambles to the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions. Hague Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulation Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague Convention II) Asaro (see note 43 above), p. 13. See http://www.springer.com/medicine/surgery/journal/11701 Asaro (see note 43 above), p. 14. 17