A/HRC/30/47 measures were undertaken not within the realm of the law of armed conflict, but under international law of law enforcement, which combined international human rights law and general principles of domestic criminal law with international criminal justice standards. 54. The use of armed private security providers to protect commercial shipping had increased in recent years, and had been an important factor in reducing the number of successful acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea. Bringing weapons on board a vessel had its own risks, in terms of physical security to crew members and respect for a State’s obligations under international law on the transfer of conventional weapons and in terms of the risk of reckless and excessive use of force, including lethal force, by personnel in an environment where effective monitoring and oversight were exceptionally hard to ensure. 55. Mr. Casey-Maslen noted that, in carrying out their duties, State law enforcement officials were required to use force only when necessary and to employ only such force as was necessary in the circumstances and proportionate to the threat. 12 Lawful use of force by private maritime security service providers was limited to acts carried out in defence of any person from unlawful violence. That might encompass lawful acts involving use of force when under imminent threat of attack, either in self-defence or in defence of others. The determination of whether any particular use of force in the maritime environment met the legal criteria might be contentious given the lack of detailed guidance at the domestic level on what was and was not lawful; materially differing domestic criminal law thresholds for justified use of force in self-defence; and a lack of consensus as to which national law should determine legality. 56. Mr. Casey-Maslen undertook a review of selected national jurisdictions and standards, including the 2012 interim guidance of the International Maritime Organization (IMO).13 He also referred to the case before an Indian court in which two Italian marines had allegedly opened fire on a vessel, killing two Indian fishermen on board; the trial of the two marines had recently been postponed to July 2015. 57. Mr. Casey-Maslen noted that a detailed code on use of force in the maritime environment was lacking and that that lacuna could not be filled in the proposed international regulatory framework. He also referred to the guidelines elaborated by the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights in 2012.14 58. He noted that the core law enforcement function of arrest, and a concomitant power to use force in order to effect a lawful arrest involving use of force, were functions inherent to the State. He added that, to some extent, those powers were delegated in the maritime environment. Whether or not private security service providers had been granted those powers, they might need to use them, leading to concerns about treatment of suspected pirates in detention and respect for the fundamental right to habeas corpus. 59. Finally, as recognized by the Security Council in its resolution 2184 (2014), the solution to the problem of piracy lay on land rather than at sea. Mr. Casey-Maslen concluded that, in the meantime, use of armed private security service providers looked likely to continue, with all the risks that that entailed. 60. One delegation noted that it was essential to acknowledge the work undertaken by IMO and that the Human Rights Council should not duplicate the work done by IMO. Another delegation underlined the primary role of IMO in the context of sea-based 12 13 14 See principle 9 of the 1990 Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, available from www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/UseOfForceAndFirearms.aspx. See www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/SecDocs/Documents/Piracy/MSC.1-Circ.1443.pdf. Available from www.geneva-academy.ch/docs/projets/Counterpiracy.pdf. 15